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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation examines the theoretical link between institutional setting for policy 
making and partisanship both in the electorate and the legislature in a consistent framework. 
I confirm this relationship by analyzing both observational data and experimental data in 
the three following papers. 
 The first paper, “Partisans in Institutional Context: Institutional Constraints on 
Policy Change and Mass Partisanship,” examines how political institutions constrain 
political parties, and thus influence mass partisanship, by connecting behavioral theories 
on partisanship with gridlock models of political institutions. I theorize that as the 
institutional constraints on policy change (measured by the number of “veto players” or 
“gridlock intervals”) increase, the political party in power is less likely to matter in 
determining policy outcomes, and therefore individuals are less likely to become partisans. 
I confirm this relationship by analyzing American National Election Studies (ANES) data 
from 1952 to 2008 and Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data that covers 
114 election surveys across 49 countries. 
 The second paper, “Change Partisans Can Believe In: Policy Change, Cues, and 
Partisan Beliefs,” scrutinizes the premise that citizens can infer policy implications from 
the institutional context, the crucial assumption that underlies my argument in the first 
paper and a growing literature that connects institutional context and mass behavior. Using 
a survey experiment, I provide evidence that citizens infer policy implications from the 
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institutional context, using “institutional cues” and “elite cues.” Moreover, I demonstrate 
that this expectation of policy change strengthens their partisan beliefs.  
The third paper, “The Partisan Secret: Institutional Constraints on Policy Change 
and Party Unity,” argues that the institutional context shapes the partisan bond among 
legislators. Viewing party unity as a broad concept that encompasses party members’ 
decisions to vote together and their decisions to belong together, I theorize that institutional 
constraints on policy change significantly reduce political parties’ abilities and incentives 
to foster party unity. Drawing upon novel measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) dataset, I find evidence to support this relationship, based on 129 countries, with 
time series extending from 1980 to 2000. 
Taken together, this research enhances our understanding of the institutional 
underpinnings of partisanship both in the electorate and in the legislature.  
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Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
 
While many renowned political scientists point out (e.g., Bryce 1921, 119; Schattschneider 
1942; Schumpeter 1942, 269) the indispensable role of political parties in modern 
democracy, recent studies document mixed evidence as to whether political parties perform 
the traditional and theoretical functions scholars have envisioned. According to 
contemporary scholarship, a political party forms as a solution to internal and external 
problems of collective action inherent in the legislative process (Aldrich 1995; Cox and 
McCubbins 1993; 2005). Without durable coalitions, legislators face chaotic and 
unpredictable outcomes in policy making. A political party also improves the electoral 
prospects of party members by providing a brand name (or reputation) along with resources 
for mobilizing citizens. Voters base their loyalty to a party on this brand. Within the 
legislature, parties provide collective benefits for legislators who face tough choices among 
votes, seats, and policies (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Fenno 1973; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014, 
372; Strøm 1990).  
Party loyalty is not preordained, however. Legislators can and do dissent from the 
party line. They can speak out publicly against the party, vote against it, and – at the limit 
– quit the party. Accordingly, a political party’s abilities and incentives to foster party unity 
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have been a central concern to in the literature on legislative behavior and political parties, 
and a growing number of scholars seek to understand variation in party unity in a 
comparative perspective. On the other hand, while partisanship has been understood as the 
single most important factor that shapes citizens’ political beliefs and actions, findings of 
substantial variability in the level of mass partisanship over time and across space have 
invited competing explanations. In this dissertation, I explore the conditions under which 
political parties become the dominant influence on political behavior – both in the 
legislature and in the electorate.  
Studies on legislative partisanship and those on mass partisanship have been 
commonly considered as two separate fields of research with little communication. 
Accordingly, existing literature has not offered a theoretical framework that cuts across 
both. In this dissertation, I consider both legislators and citizens’ partisan behavior their 
actions and responses to incentives and constraints determined by their institutional 
surroundings. In particular, I focus on the theoretical implications of institutional 
constraints for policy change, and connect both the literature on party unity and that on 
mass partisanship to a consistent analytical framework of comparative political institutions.  
Recent advancements in institutional theories have paid particular attention to 
institutional configurations that determine the extent of policy change or gridlock (Binder 
1999; Brady and Volden 1998; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Krehbiel 1996, 1998; Mayhew 
1991; Tsebelis 1995; 2002). Despite the differences in the precise specifications of 
theoretical models and empirical tests, there is a growing theoretical consensus that 
explains policy stability as a function of the array of preferences of key institutional actors, 
known as veto players or pivotal voters, and the location of the status quo 
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Drawing upon this theoretical framework on political institutions, I contend that 
institutional constraints on policy change (measured by the number of “veto players” or 
“gridlock intervals”) significantly reduce political parties’ capacities and incentives to 
foster party unity, as well as citizens’ incentives and motivations to form partisan 
attachment. I demonstrate that the institutional dynamic of party loyalty in the legislature 
follows the exactly same pattern as that found in the electorate. This framework also 
enables us to systematically analyze both spatial and temporal variation in the patterns of 
partisanship. I confirm this systematic relationship, utilizing a mixed-methods approach 
combining cross-national observational data analysis and novel experimental designs.  
 
1.1 Outline of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized into three empirical papers (chapters), each of which can be 
read in isolation.  In Chapter 2, I examine how political institutions constrain political 
parties, and thus influence mass partisanship, by connecting behavioral theories on 
partisanship with gridlock models of political institutions. Existing approaches have not 
provided a theoretical framework that cuts across different political contexts. The 
analytical usefulness of the concept of partisanship in European context is still a matter of 
dispute, and scholars find it difficult to apply this core concept in new democracies despite 
the prevalence of arguments that mass partisanship contributes to the development of a 
stable party system and enhances prospects of democratic consolidation. On the other hand, 
despite the recent advance in comparative institutional analysis, its significant theoretical 
implications for mass attitudes and behavior have rarely been investigated. I theorize that 
as the institutional constraints on policy change increase, the party differential, or  
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comparative benefit of having a party in office decreases, and therefore individuals are less 
likely to become partisans.  
I find evidence to support this relationship, by analyzing American National 
Election Study (ANES) data from 1952 to 2008 using advanced multilevel models, and test 
the generalizability of these findings using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) 
data that covers 114 election surveys across 49 countries. My approach enables us to 
explain the patterns of mass partisanship over time in the United States and across diverse 
democracies in a consistent way, regardless of the level of their institutional complexity, 
providing the broadest empirical examination yet conducted on this question. In contrast 
to existing theoretical predictions, my account suggests that party polarization may not 
always lead to the rise of mass partisanship, as in the United States; rather it can lead to the 
decline in mass partisanship as a result of its interplay with institutional configurations and 
subsequent policy gridlock. 
In Chapter 3, I scrutinize the premise that citizens can infer policy implications 
from the given institutional context, the crucial assumption that underlies my findings in 
Chapter 1 and a growing literature that connects institutional context and mass behavior. 
In particular, I explore whether citizens can understand potential policy change from the 
given institutional context, as well as the behavioral consequence of this policy expectation. 
In this chapter, I view citizens as “cognitive misers” who attempt to make efficient 
decisions under circumstances of limited information, limited ability to process 
information, and limited incentives to become politically engaged. Citizens achieve this 
low-information rationality through the use of information shortcuts or heuristics. In 
particular, this chapter examine how two distinct types of cues available in institutional 
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context – what I call ‘institutional cues’ and ‘elite cues’ respectively – enable citizens to 
shape their understanding of potential policy change, and how such perceptions affect 
partisan beliefs. In particular, I present a survey experiment that isolates the effects of both 
of these cues based on a large sample of U.S. adults whose demographics closely resemble 
the U.S. adult population. My experimental design permits direct evaluation of the relative 
impact of two cues, their interactive effect on policy expectation, and subsequent 
consequences for partisan beliefs.  
I find that citizens shape their policy expectations in the given institutional context 
by relying on both easily observable institutional attributes and political elites’ opinion as 
heuristic tools, challenging the long-standing yet dim view of citizen competence in the 
context of complex policy making processes. While easily accessible and direct elite 
opinions play a large role in forming citizens’ perceptions, a relatively indirect cue that 
requires moderate informational processing shows a consistent effect as well. I also find 
that citizens use both cues effectively, rather than attending to the most effective cues while 
ignoring others. Finally, the findings show that public expectations of policy change 
strengthen partisan beliefs, suggesting micro-level foundations to link macro-level 
institutional arrangements and partisan behavior, one of the most studied forms of political 
behavior. Together, my findings not only advance our theoretical and empirical 
understanding of how citizens understand institutions and process but also illustrate why 
this research agenda merits further study. My study expands the scope of behavioral 
research that incorporates the role of institutional setting for policy making and provides 
the micro-foundation of a growing body of works that link political institutions and mass 
behavior. 
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In Chapter 4, I argue that institutional context shapes the partisan bond among 
legislators. Viewing party unity as a broad concept that encompasses party members’ 
decisions to vote together and their decisions to belong together, I explain party unity as 
the result of legislators’ actions and response to incentives and constraints determined by 
their institutional environment. Connecting the contemporary understanding of political 
parties to the analytical framework of comparative political institutions, I demonstrate how 
institutional conditions for policy making affect political parties’ abilities and incentives to 
foster unity. In particular, I argue that the institutional arrangements allowing for a greater 
extent of policy change should increase party unity and magnify the impact of candidate 
selection – one of party leaders’ key disciplinary tools – on party unity. I confirm my 
hypotheses, utilizing novel measures of party unity from the most recent Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. I analyze the largest time-series cross-sectional dataset on 
party unity to date, and I find that institutional constraints on policy change are a significant 
and substantively important factor to account for legislators’ party voting and party 
switching. As institutional arrangements do not allow significant policy changes, party 
members are more likely to voice their dissent and exit as well. Also, I find that the positive 
impact of centralized candidate selection on party unity is conditioned by the institutional 
arrangements that structure policy making. This resolves some of the conflicting claims 
regarding the determinants of party unity. Also, my findings confirm previous arguments 
that emphasize the way policy making is organized by institutional context but that have 
rarely been tested with large-scale quantitative data (Cox 1987; Cheibub 2007; Figueiredo 
and Lomongi 2000). The new dataset affords a greater leverage in estimating and 
disentangling the effects of different institutional factors. Taken together, this research 
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presented here enhances our understanding of the institutional underpinnings of 
partisanship both in the electorate and in the legislature.    
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Chapter II 
 
Partisans in Institutional Context:  
Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Mass Partisanship 
 
 
Abstract 
This article examines the link between citizens' partisanship and the institutional context 
that constrains potential policy changes. Combining institutional and behavioral theories, 
I argue that as the institutional constraints on policy change increase, the political party in 
power is less likely to matter in determining policy outcomes, and therefore individuals are 
less likely to become partisans. I confirm this systematic relationship using multilevel 
analyses of the ANES data from 1964 to 2008 and the CSES data that covers 114 surveys 
across 49 countries. This approach enables us to explain the patterns of partisanship across 
diverse political contexts in a consistent way, regardless of the level of their institutional 
complexity. In contrast to existing studies, my results also suggest that party polarization 
can lead to the decline of mass partisanship as a result of its interplay with institutional 
configurations and subsequent policy gridlock. 
 
 
11 
2.1 Introduction 
Since partisanship or party identification was first viewed as a fairly stable 
psychological attachment to a political party in the classic Michigan model, this concept 
has been at the core of our understanding of citizens’ political perceptions, opinions, and 
actions (Bartels, 2002; Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler, 2004). Partisanship serves as an organizing device for one’s understanding 
of the complexities of politics1 (Bartels 2002; Campbell et al., 1960; Downs, 1957; Zaller, 
1992); it shapes citizens’ issue positions (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004; Markus 
and Converse 1979), vote choice (Bartels 2000), and even their core values (Goren 2005); 
and partisanship mobilizes individuals to participate in the process of electoral democracy 
(Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Therefore, scholars 
concluded that partisanship is “the linchpin of our modern understanding of electoral 
democracy” (Weisberg and Greene 2003, 115), or “the most important development in 
modern electoral behavior research” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 20). Recently, evidence 
also shows that partisanship can play a significant role in many aspects of non-political 
domains, including residential preferences (Bishop 2009), scholarship allocations (Munro, 
Lasane, and Leary 2010; Iyengar and Westwood 2015), and mate selection (Alford et al. 
2011; Klofstad, Casey A. McDermott and Hatemi 2012). 
Despite the extensive body of literature, findings of substantial variability in the 
level of mass partisanship over time (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Wattenberg, 1985; see 
also Bartels 2000; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Mackuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1989) and 
                                                            
1 Also, prior studies show that partisanship can affect one’s perception of the economy whose 
relatively objective evidence is available  (Duch, Harvey, and Anderson 2010; Evans and Andersen 
2006; Gerber and Huber 2009). 
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across space (Berglund et al. 2006; Bengtsson et al. 2013; Holmberg 1994; Leduc 1981; 
Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Thomassen 1979) have raised a question about the 
generalizability of the concept, leaving us a puzzle of how to explain these contextual 
variations. To untangle this puzzle, two major explanations have been proposed. A first 
explanation finds its answer from a broad transformative force that social and political 
modernization brings (Dalton 1984; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). According to Russell 
Dalton and his colleagues, modernization leads to a politically more sophisticated citizen 
who no longer needs the cost-saving device of partisanship in the realm of politics, and 
thus, their so-called dealingment hypothesis holds that partisan ties have been generally 
eroding especially in most advanced industrial societies. A second view is that it is the 
degree of ideological polarization that affects people’s party loyalty. In particular, recent 
studies in the field of American politics attempt to establish a positive association between 
patterns of mass partisanship and unprecedented party polarization in the United States 
(Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Hetherington 2001; Levendusky 2010; 
Nicholson 2012; see Lupu 2014 for comparative study). This alternative perspective states 
that people who perceive larger differences between parties tend to develop stronger 
partisanship.  
In this paper, I pay attention to the important discrepancy between these theoretical 
predictions and empirical observations, and seek to address crucial questions that existing 
approaches have not fully resolved. Specifically, with respect to the first explanation, how 
can we explain notable variations still existing within advanced democracies? Can we 
develop a general theory to explain complex patterns in mass partisanship in a much 
broader context including new democracies? Concerning the second, how can we explain 
13 
stability in, or even decline of mass partisanship over time in the United States at the 
aggregate level despite the unprecedented polarization between the two major parties? 
What is the unexplored countervailing process that constrains the resurgence of 
partisanship and even leads to partisan decline? 
To answer these unresolved questions, I focus on the importance of institutional 
contexts and their consequences for policy outcomes, to which existing scholarship on 
partisanship has paid relatively little attention. Combining institutional theories with 
behavioral ones, I argue that as the institutional constraints on policy change increase, the 
political party in power is less likely to matter in determining policy outcomes, and 
therefore individuals are less likely to become partisans. Recent advancements in 
institutional theories have paid particular attention to institutional configurations that 
determine the extent of policy change or gridlock (Binder 1999; Brady and Volden 1998; 
Cox and McCubbins 2001; Krehbiel 1996, 1998; Mayhew 1991; Tsebelis 1995; 2002), and 
scholars have actively applied this framework to various aspects of political life, ranging 
from legislative performance (Binder 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Krehbiel 1996, 1998; 
Tsebelis 1995) to macroeconomic policy outcomes (Bawn 1999; Franzese 2002; 
Hallerberg and von Hagen 1998), even to civil war duration (Cunningham 2006).  
Nevertheless, this theoretical implication of institutional constraints on policy 
changes has rarely been incorporated into the study of public opinion and political behavior. 
According to existing micro-level behavioral theories on partisanship, however, this 
institutional consequence can have significant effects on the partisan’s cognition and 
motivation as well as rational calculation of self-interest. As the institutional constraints on 
policy change decrease, the political party in power is more likely to matter in determining 
14 
policy outcomes, and therefore individuals are more likely to become partisans, by 
expecting to maximize their future utilities (Achen, 1992; Bullock, 2009; Fiorina 1981; 
Gerber and Green, 1998), by better distinguishing the parties and feeling greater attachment 
toward their party over the other(s) (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickle 2002), and by better justifying or rationalizing their motivated reasoning 
(Groenendyk 2009; Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lodge and Taber 2000). 
I test this hypothesis through multiple multilevel analyses of the American National 
Election Studies (ANES) data from 1964 to 2008, and further examine the generalizability 
of this finding using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data that covers 
114 election surveys across 49 countries, covering both temporal and spatial variation in 
the level of partisanship. Across different datasets and alternative measures, I find 
empirical evidence that the institutional arrangements that produce policy gridlock 
discourage partisanship in the mass public. My analysis offers the broadest empirical 
examination on this topic, suggesting an alternative and more general explanation that can 
cover diverse democracies including new democracies as well as the United States. This 
paper also connects the literature on political institutions and that on political behavior, two 
lines of research that have conventionally been studied separately in the field.2  Moreover, 
it provides a new perspective to our understanding of the elite-mass relationship, and the 
longstanding debate on the relative impact of partisanship versus policy factors on political 
behavior. In particular, my account offers both the theoretical explanation and empirical 
                                                            
2 For example, in the field of American politics, the literature on divided government and that on 
partisanship have respectively constituted the core of studies on political institutions and those on 
political behavior. This study shows how these two lines of studies can meet and how such 
theoretical connection can provide new insights to understand the consequences of current party 
polarization. 
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evidence that party polarization may not always lead to the rise of mass partisanship, as in 
the United States; rather it may lead to the decline in citizens’ partisanship as a result of its 
interplay with institutional configurations, and subsequent policy gridlock. 
The article proceeds as follows: the first section briefly reviews the existing 
explanations regarding contextual variation in mass partisanship; the second section 
connects recent achievements in institutional analysis at the macro-level and diverse micro-
level behavioral theories on partisanship; in the third section, I present empirical evidence 
that is robust against different measures and model specifications, showing that 
institutional constraints significantly shapes individual’s partisanship. I close with a 
discussion of implications for the existing literature and recent debate regarding this topic. 
 
2.2 Explaining Contextual Variation in Mass Partisanship 
In the traditional view, partisanship is characterized as similar to a social identity, 
formed early in life and resistant to change through life, constituting the core of individuals’ 
political beliefs and actions (Campbell et al. 1960; Gerber et al. 2010). On the other hand, 
the alternative view conceptualizes partisanship as a “running tally” of retrospective 
evaluations from the rational choice perspective, and scholars have shown that partisanship 
is endogenous with issue positions and susceptible to movement (Fiorina 1981; Achen 
1989, 1992; MacKuen et al. 1989; Franklin 1992; Franklin and Jackson 1983). While most 
of the previous debate on the notion of partisanship has been centered on its relative fixity, 
there is a growing consensus that partisanship is relatively stable, but by no means 
unchanging (as an overview, see Bartels 2010, 243; Johnston 2006, 332). Accordingly, the 
current scholarship focuses on various factors that explain notable variations in party ties, 
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and particularly, different patterns of partisanship across time and space.3 As pointed out 
in recent overviews of the literature (Bengtsson et al. 2013; Huber et al. 2005; Johnston 
2006; Lupu 2014; Thomassen 2005), in contrast to voluminous studies that have been 
conducted to investigate the nature of partisanship in the United States, a systematic cross-
national analysis to study the influence of context is still lacking. 
While two important explanations have been proposed to resolve this puzzle, they 
produce a series of conflicting results in terms of both theoretical aspects and empirical 
evidence. According to Russell Dalton and his colleagues (Dalton 1984; Dalton and 
Wattenberg 2000), “party ties were generally eroding as a consequence of social and 
political modernization,” as the growing proportion of well-educated, politically-
knowledgeable, and cognitively sophisticated voters would be less inclined to develop 
strong psychological attachment to specific parties, “and thus most advanced industrial 
societies should experience a dealignment trend” (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 22). 
However, despite the overall trend of partisan decline, many scholars find compelling 
evidence that partisanship has developed in various patterns and in a more complex way 
than the so-called dealignment thesis would predict (Berglund et al. 2006; Bengtsson et al. 
2013; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995). For example, Schmitt and Holmberg (1995) conclude 
that “specific developments, by country and party, are so varied that any general ‘overall’ 
view disguises more than it discloses” by analyzing fourteen West European countries and 
the United States. In particular, the United States is a very important exception to the 
                                                            
3 Some scholars suspect that much of the variation may be an artifact of measurement error. Many 
other studies, however, have documented that it cannot be simply attributed to the problem of 
methods or measurements (for an overview, see Bartels 2008; Johnston 2006; Niemi and Weisberg 
2001). 
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dealignment pattern (e.g., Bartels 2000; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Hetherington 2001). 
How can we explain complex variations still existing within advanced democracies?  
Recent individual-level analyses also raise a question about the micro-level 
mechanism that generates the aggregate-level partisan dealingment. According to these 
studies, the relationship between political sophistication and partisan dealignment is rather 
opposite to Dalton and his colleagues’ “dealignment hypothesis.” That is, politically 
sophisticated voters are more, not less likely to be partisans (Albright 2009; Dassonneville, 
Hooghe, and Vanhoutte 2012; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Vanhoutte 2014; Joslyn and 
Haider-Markel 2014; Arzheimer 2015).4 
Lastly, the exclusion of new democracies in xisting comparative studies is 
unfortunate for not only a theoretical but also normative reasons.5 The study on acquisition 
of party attachments in new democracies may be particularly important given the 
prevalence of arguments that mass partisanship contributes to the development of stable 
party system and enhances prospects of democratic consolidation (Brader and Tucker 2001; 
Converse and Dupeux 1962; Almond and Verba 1963; Converse 1969; Mainwaring 1999; 
Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton and Weldon 2007; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 
2004). Moreover, there remains the question of how we can develop a general theory to 
explain patterns of mass partisanship in a much broader context including new democracies.  
An alternative explanation emphasizes a shorter-term political context such as the 
extent of ideological polarization between major political parties, rather than long-term 
                                                            
4 Related to this point, Jessee (2009) presents notable evidence that even highly informed partisans 
show significant biases by the spatial standard while partisans tend to converge toward the behavior 
of independents as information levels increase. 
5 In Dalton’s (2000) analysis, even Greece, Spain, and Portugal are excluded on the grounds that 
they have relatively new democratic systems and their socio‐economic development trails the 
advanced industrial democracies. 
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social changes (Berglund et al. 2006; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Schmitt 2009; 
Holmberg 1994). In particular, scholars in the field of American politics make a theoretical 
connection between recent attention to party polarization and patterns of mass partisanship 
(Hetherington 2001; Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; 
Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Levendusky 2009; Levendusky 2010; Lupu 2014; 
Nicholson 2012). Despite the differences in precise processes they emphasize and their 
methods to test the hypotheses, these studies have made the same prediction: the highest 
level of polarization between the two parties would generate the “resurgence” of mass 
partisanship – rather than its decline – in the United States. Hetherington (2001) states, 
“more partisan elite behavior caused by polarization should clarify party positions for the 
public, which in turn should influence the importance and salience of parties.” Lupu (2014) 
also confirms Hetherington’s (2001) argument by testing the impact of party polarization 
on mass partisanship based on a broad set of data. Recent experimental studies show that 
party polarization is likely to increase partisan behaviors either by providing clearer signals 
(Levendusky 2010), by activating group bias (Nicholson 2012), or by stimulating 
motivated reasoning (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). While this claim is very 
intuitive and self-explanatory, it indeed needs reconciliation with the empirical observation 
that mass partisanship at the aggregate level has been fairly stable, if not in decline, over 
time in the United States despite the unprecedented polarization between the two major 
parties.6 How can we explain this important discrepancy between the prior theoretical 
prediction and empirical observation? What is the unexplored countervailing process that 
constrains the resurgence of partisanship and can even lead to a decline of mass 
                                                            
6 Refer to Figure 2.1 for the overall trend of partisanship over time in the United States. 
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partisanship? I seek to address these remaining questions by focusing on the important role 
of political institutions in constraining potential policy change, which has a significant 
influence on the micro-level process in which partisans shape their loyalty to their parties. 
  
2.3 Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Mass Partisanship 
I propose an institutional explanation by integrating behavioral theories at the micro level 
and institutional theories at the macro level. For this purpose, I first pay attention to 
Anthony Downs's core concept, “expected party differential,” which has been actively 
employed to explain individuals’ political decision-making. Deriving from the comparison 
of the expected utilities an individual would receive if each party were in office (Downs 
1957; Key 1966; Fiorina 1981), this utility concept has been central to the rational-choice 
perspective on partisanship (Achen 1992; Bullock 2009; Gerber and Green 1998). Gerber 
and Green (1998), for example, equate expected party differential with partisanship (see 
also Jackson and Kollman 2011). An individual is more likely to form loyalty to a political 
party that can provide a higher party differential. 
According to Anthony Downs (1957, 39), however, 
 
“A voter makes his decisions by comparing future performances he expects 
from the competing parties. But, if he is rational, he knows that no party will 
be able to do everything that it says it will do. Hence, he cannot merely 
compare platforms; instead he must estimate in his own mind what the parties 
would actually do were they in power.”  
 
This is where political institutions play a significant role (Fiorina 1992; Kedar 2005; 
Lacy and Paolino 1998). 7  Well-established studies of both American politics and 
                                                            
7 Lacy and Paolino (1998, 1182) argue that voters  choose  between  candidates  based  on  the  
policy  outcomes  they  expect  from  the candidates  rather  than  on  the  policy  platforms  of  the  
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comparative politics have made clear predictions about the extent of policy change as a 
function of the array of preferences of key institutional actors, known as veto players or 
pivotal voters, interacting with the rules of the game. That is, political institutions can 
significantly affect citizens’ party differentials and, in turn, their partisanship by shaping 
the levels of potential policy changes. If the institutional constraints on policy change 
increase, the political party in power would be less likely to matter in determining policy 
outcomes, and therefore citizens are less likely to form loyalty to a certain political party. 
Since David Mayhew’s (1991) seminal study of divided government, many 
scholars in the field of American politics have examined the theoretical and empirical 
significance of political institutions in terms of their ability to change the policy of the 
status quo (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; Binder 1999; Coleman 1999; Chiou 
and Rothenberg 2003). According to Krehbiel (1996; 1998), the extent of such policy 
change is constrained by constitutional and congressional rules, in particular, the 
presidential veto, the two-thirds requirement for veto overrides, and the three-fifths cloture 
requirement for overcoming senatorial filibusters. The floor median proposes legislation 
that must then avoid a filibuster and win the approval of either the veto pivots or the 
president. The policy status quo located between the preferences of veto players cannot be 
readily revised, and this prediction concerns the key concept known as the gridlock interval: 
the set of status quo policies on the ideological spectrum for which policy change is 
impossible. In the field of comparative politics, Tsebelis (1995; 2002) develops a veto-
players theory that provides a simple but rigorous framework to analyze the diverse 
institutional structures across countries and over time. According to Tsebelis, a veto player 
                                                            
candidates, and that their expectations about  the  policy  outputs  of  candidates  depend  on  the  
partisan  control  of  the  separate branches  of  government  in  a  separation  of  powers  system. 
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is “an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a change in policy” 
and thus, significant departures from the status quo are impossible when veto players are 
many – that is, when the number of veto players or the ideological distance among them 
increases. In a similar vein, Cox and McCubbins (2001) also stress the importance of this 
notion, and define the “effective” number of vetoes in a system as a function of the number 
of institutional veto points and the diversity of preferences of the agents controlling those 
veto points, noting that “changing policy becomes increasingly costly as the number of 
parties to a negotiation [veto players], or as the diversity of their preferences, increases” 
(Cox and McCubbins 2001, 27).  
Despite the differences in the precise specifications of theoretical models and 
empirical tests, these studies make clear predictions about policy stability as a function of 
the array of preferences of key institutional actors (veto players or pivotal voters) 
interacting with the structure of political institutions. Combining the micro-level theories 
on partisanship with institutional theories, I hypothesize that citizens are more likely to 
become partisans in the institutional contexts which allow higher levels of policy changes. 
Partisans are commonly juxtaposed in contrast to policy-oriented voters in existing 
literature. The spatial models of voting assume that voters are motivated by polices, 
regardless of whether they seek to vote for the closest policy positions (Black 1948; Jessee 
2009; Jessee 2010; Tomz and Van Houweling 2008; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook 1970) 
or to achieve the closest policy outcomes (Adams, Bishin, and Dow 2008; Adams, Merrill 
III, and Grofman 2005; Fiorina 1992; Grofman 1985; Kedar 2005; Lacy and Paolino 1998). 
The studies with a psychological perspective sharply disagree with the spatial models and 
emphasize the role of non-policy factors, including the most prominent one – partisanship 
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(Cohen 2003; Rahn 1993; Campbell et al. 1960). Accordingly, even until recently, many 
studies have centered on the debate regarding the relative influence of policy versus 
partisanship on voting behavior and public opinion (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; 
Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Bullock 2011; Cohen 2003; Jessee 2009, 2010; Kedar 
2009).8 I contend that partisanship and policy are not substitutes, but rather that the policy 
dimension should be integrated to fully understand how partisans think and behave. By 
reconciling existing theory and evidence, I show that individuals are more likely to become 
partisans, as the institutional context in which they find themselves allows for larger 
degrees of policy change. 
My institutional approach may be understood largely as a rational choice 
perspective in that citizens seeks to maximize their future expected utilities, and thus their 
partisanship is assumed to be relatively susceptible to movement (even if within a limited 
range),9 but with important distinctions: it does not assume a priori that citizens necessarily 
rely on retrospective evaluations of past performance to derive the party differential – 
which is inherently the prospective evaluation of party performance. Nor do I assume that 
citizens necessarily involve mindful and systematic processing of the information 
regarding substantive policy outcomes or detailed institutional features, in contrast to the 
premise of Fiorina (1981) and most Bayesian models (Achen 1992; Gerber and Green 1998; 
                                                            
8 This is well represented by the contrasting titles of two recent studies,  “Party over Policy: The 
Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs,” by Geoffrey Cohen (2003), and 
“Voting for Policy, Not Parties: How Voters Compensate for Power Sharing,” by Orit Kedar (2009). 
9  Of course, no one would argue that partisanship is absolutely fixed or absolutely flexible. 
Nevertheless, in many traditional psychological studies, partisanship was thought to originate from 
one’s childhood socialization into politics, primarily via the family; changes in partisanship 
occurred mainly as a result of infrequent party realignments. Thus, for many years, partisanship 
was seen as an “unmoved mover” that could affect other political attitudes without being affected 
by political events (Johnston 2006; Niemi and Weisberg 2001, 322). 
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Bullock 2009). Rather, citizens can derive this estimate of comparative benefits from a 
wide range of potential heuristics and shortcuts either directly or indirectly from the given 
institutional context. Fiorina (1992), for example, argues that recent experience with 
divided control of government may give some voters both an incentive and a cue to assess 
political parties based on how the different branches’ powers, in combination with 
candidates’ positions, will produce policy outcomes. Lacy and Paolino (1998) find 
evidence that voters consider the power and issue positions of the executive and the 
legislature in his or her vote choice. Moreover, media coverage, or expert opinions on 
policy gridlock (or sweeping policy changes) can also help a citizen form his or her 
evaluation of the expected policy change and the party differential (Mondak 1994; Page, 
Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987; Iyengar and Kinder 1987). Combining this literature, Hahm 
(2015) shows that the public can infer policy implications of institutional attributes such as 
divided government by using both “institutional cues” and “elite cues,” and tests their 
relative impact on citizens’ perceptions of policy change.10 
Although this notion of party differential has been primarily discussed against the 
social-psychological studies, it is not theoretically incompatible with alternative 
conceptualizations of partisanship. Drawing upon social identity theory developed by 
Tajfel and Turner (1979), Green and his colleagues (2002) argue that the “traditional” view 
of partisanship has not been fully articulated, and explicitly conceptualize partisanship as 
a form of social group identification. They claim that partisan identification functions in 
much the same way as does an individual’s identification with religious denominations. 
                                                            
10 See also Vowles (2010) and Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) for the cross-national evidence that 
citizens can infer the extent or the direction of policy change from the given political context, in 
the absence of detailed information about parties’ legislative records. 
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According to social identity theory, a sense of identity takes place through social 
categorization through which individuals define who they are and who others are (Tajfel 
and Turner 1979; for a recent review, see Kinder and Kam 2009). Although this literature 
– specifically, what is known as the minimal group paradigm – demonstrates that mere 
categorization based on an arbitrary criterion is sufficient to produce discriminatory 
intergroup behaviors in the form of ingroup favoritism, its goal is not to deny the role of 
objective conflicts of interest. Tajfel (1981, 223) himself asserts that “this theory cannot 
replace the economic and social analysis, but must be used to supplement it.” When such 
categorization is combined with the real conflicts of group interests, such identification can 
be further strengthened. When there exists no difference in the benefit each political party 
provides, it may not be always easy to form a strong identity with a particular party over 
the others. To the contrary, the greater utility differential between the parties can make us 
better distinguish/categorize “our party” versus “their parties,” and to form positive 
attachment toward “our party.”  
Theories of motivated reasoning anticipate that citizens are always constrained by 
their partisan predispositions, even when they try to be accurate (Lodge and Taber 2000; 
Taber and Lodge 2006; see also Kunda 1990). “Partisan goals,” (or “directional goals”) 
which motivate people to apply their reasoning powers in defense of a prior belief, bias not 
only citizens’ judgments, but also the process through which those judgments are reached 
(Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Westen et al. 2006).11  “The tension 
between the drives for accuracy and belief perseverance underlies all human reasoning” 
                                                            
11 Bullock (2009) formally proves that enduring disagreement among partisans does not necessarily 
contradict the rational Bayesian updating perspective, and establishes conditions under which 
learning will create agreement and conditions under which it will promote disagreement. 
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(Taber and Lodge 2006, 756). However, people tend to believe what they wish only to the 
extent they feel the evidence could satisfy the other category of motives, accuracy goals 
(Groenendyk 2009; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006). That is, 
motivated reasoning would be contingent on one’s capacity to justify or rationalize that 
judgment. “When one wants to draw a particular conclusion, one feels obligated to 
construct a justification for that conclusion that would be plausible to a dispassionate 
observer” (Kunda 1990, 493). Thus, the clearer party differentials can serve as this 
justification for one’s leaning toward his or her partisan predisposition. Conversely, when 
they perceive little party differential, all but the most fervent partisans would find it 
difficult to construct a seemingly reasonable justification for their partisan leaning. 
In sum, political institutions can significantly affect the partisan’s cognition and 
motivation as well as her rational utility calculation by shaping the levels of potential policy 
changes. I hypothesize that as the institutional constraints on policy change increase, 
citizens are less likely to become partisans.  
 
2.4 Data and Methods 
I test my hypothesis using two different sets of cross-sectional survey data from the ANES 
and the CSES (modules 1-3) to examine the variation in mass partisanship both over time 
in the United States and across countries. This broad coverage serves not only to increase 
confidence about empirical evidence that supports the proposed hypothesis, but also to 
establish the generalizability of the findings while contributing to the established literature 
that has originally been developed to study U.S. politics. 
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The ANES and the CSES collect important information about individual opinions 
and cover a broad range of elections over time and across countries. However, given the 
goal of this study, both a contextual-level dataset that measures institutional constraints 
and a data set that specifies individual-level variables such as partisanship and other 
demographic information are necessary. For this purpose, I combine two survey datasets 
with different measures of institutional constraints and other contextual-level covariates. 
The proposed relationship between institutional gridlock and partisanship is less 
likely to hold for countries where political parties do not serve their relevant roles that 
democratic systems require. For example, where political parties cannot play any roles in 
aggregating people’s political demands and mobilizing people to influence the policy-
making process, people may not be able to form any attachment to political parties. 
However, to test my hypothesis for a broad spectrum of countries, I include both new 
democracies and old democracies where voters have at least two competing political parties 
to choose from in the election. Specifically, I focus on democracies that satisfy the 
minimalist criteria that are proposed by Adam Przeworski and his colleagues (Alvarez et 
al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009; Przeworski et al. 2000). According to what 
they later call Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) measure, “democracies are regimes in which 
governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, 
and Vreeland 2009, 69). This concept is minimalist, especially compared to two other 
commonly-used measures of political regimes: the Freedom House measure that is based 
on more than 25 checklist questions regarding political rights and civil liberties, and the 
Polity IV measure that records key qualities of political regime including constraints on 
27 
the chief executive.12 My sample covers the surveys conducted in 114 election surveys 
across 49 democracies where political parties play a meaningful role in politics. While the 
repeated cross-sectional ANES surveys cover elections in the United States since 1948, I 
focus on 20 survey years between 1964 and 2008, due to the availability of measures for 
main variables. The specific measures and procedures are as follows. 
For the ANES data, I use the traditional questions to measure partisanship. I code 
“strong identifiers,” “weak identifiers,” and “leaners” as “partisans” while coding the other 
respondents as “non-partisans.” For additional analyses to increase confidence about the 
finding, I replace this dichotomous measure of partisanship with two alternative measures: 
1. the same dichotomous measure with a different coding method (partisans excluding 
leaners), and 2. an ordinal measure of ‘strength of partisanship’ (0: nonpartisan or 
                                                            
12 One notable complication emerges from the DD measure’s strict scrutiny over the case where 
some incumbents who have come to power via contested elections have eliminated them while in 
office. In cases like this, Przeworski and his colleagues code as non-democratic all the years from 
the moment the incumbent came to power to the moment when contested elections were eliminated. 
As they point out, it is difficult to distinguish (1) regimes where incumbents never lose power 
because they are popular but would step down if they did lose elections, from (2) regimes in which 
incumbents hold elections only because they know they will not lose them and would not step down 
if they did lose (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2009). This problem is addressed if they can 
observe whether incumbents allowed the opposition to assume office when they finally lost, but 
they use caution in classifying regimes as democracies, and thus code as dictatorship the cases 
where such retrospective identification is not available. The DD measure identify such cases using 
a variable called “Type II,” an indicator variable coded one if the dictatorship presents a possible 
Type II error – i.e., a false negative – and zero otherwise. Given my research question in this paper, 
I include most elections with the Type II variable coded one into my analysis, as long as voters 
have at least two political parties to choose from. For this purpose, I refer to the Polity IV as a 
complimentary measure to identify such cases. The Polity scores are often converted into regime 
categories in a categorization of “autocracies” (-10 to -6), “anocracies” (-5 to +5 and three special 
values: -66, -77 and -88), and “democracies” (+6 to +10). Thus, an election which is coded as 
dictatorship but whose Type II variable is coded one by the DD measure is also included into my 
analysis as long as its Polity score is 6 or greater. Mexico (1997), Russia (2000, 2004), South Africa 
(2009), and Krygyzstan (2005) are such examples. Peru (2000), and Russia (1999) whose Type II 
variable is coded one are dropped as their Polity score are less than 6. Belarus (2001, 2008), and 
Thailand (2000) do not satisfy the DD’s minimalist standard. I omit Belgium (1999) as its 
measurement is not comparable to the rest of the sample, as previous studies do (Huber, Kernell, 
and Leoni 2005; Lupu 2014) 
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independent, 1: leaner, 2: weak partisan, 3 strong partisan) to assess whether institutional 
constraints on policy change not only encourage citizens to become partisans, but also 
strengthen their partisanship. 
For cross-national analysis, my measure of partisanship relies on one of the most 
widely used approach in comparative studies (Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Lupu 2014; 
Dalton and Weldon 2007) using the CSES data. The CSES survey asks respondents in each 
country, “do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” If a 
respondent replies “yes” to the question, he or she is coded as a partisan. All other 
respondents are coded as “non-partisans.” 
Institutional constraints on policy change is a central notion in this study, and I use 
several different measures to increase the validity of the measurement and the robustness 
of the findings. The first measure, Henisz’s Political Constraint Index (POLCON) provides 
a valid approximate measure of institutional theories on veto players (or veto points) by 
directly capturing “the feasibility of a change in policy given the structure of a nation’s 
political institutions (the number of veto points) and the preferences of the actors that 
inhabit them (the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity or 
homogeneity of the preferences within each branch)” (Henisz and Zelner 2010). This 
measure first identifies the number of independent government branches (executive, lower 
and upper chambers of the legislature) with veto power over policy change, and weights 
this by the extent of alignment across these branches, using data on party composition of 
the executive and the legislature. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent 
of preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Possible scores for the final 
measure of political constraints range from zero (least constrained) to one (most 
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constrained) while they do from 0.112 (Brazil in 2006) to 0.72 (Belgium in 2003) in my 
sample. This measure is consistent with the theoretical insights supported by Tsebelis 
(1995, 2002) and Cox and McCubbins (2001). An important advantage of this measure is 
that it provides the most comprehensive coverage of countries and time periods (more than 
200 countries, 1800-2012, though not necessarily continuously) while paying special 
attention to the institutional consequences for policy stability. 
An analysis of the ANES data may require an alternative measure that captures a 
more nuanced variation over time within the United States, compared to the analysis of the 
CSES data which requires a measure that can cover the broadest range of countries with 
diverse institutional characteristics across countries in a common framework. Despite its 
broad coverage, this POLCON measure may not successfully reflect temporal dynamics 
within the US context. For the purpose of capturing the most relevant institutional feature 
of the policy gridlock, I utilize Keith Krehbiel’s (1996; 1998) gridlock interval. I construct 
this institutional variable using Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores that 
estimate the ideological positions of legislators.13 Alternatively, I also use the veto players 
data developed by Tsebelis (1995; 2002) and refined/extended by Ha (2007) to include the 
United States. This data provides a measure of veto players operationalized in terms of 
institutional and partisan divisions (the effective number of veto players, and the 
ideological distance among them). This alternative measure enables additional tests to 
                                                            
13 Note that there were changes in the cloture rule during this period. Before 1958, cloture required 
67 votes (two-thirds of all members). Between 1959 and 1974 cloture required two thirds of those 
voting, which this analysis assumes to be 64 votes. This formulation follows Coleman (1999) and 
is also used by Chiou and Rothenberg (2003). Finally, from 1975 through the present, cloture has 
required 60 votes. see Coleman (1999, 833) for the detailed description. 
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compare with the findings from the CSES data and to increase the robustness of the 
findings. 
To isolate the effect of institutional constraints on partisanship, I include control 
variables that are commonly used to measure other contextual-level factors, individual-
level political characteristics, and demographic variables. As pointed out above, previous 
literature has focused on the way the process of social modernization influences contributes 
to a slow and steady erosion in citizens’ attachment to political parties. To account for this 
possibility, I control for the GDP per capita which serves as a proxy for the average income 
or level of socio-economic development. Partisanship may be associated with the structure 
of social cleavages, as conflicts and controversies arising out of social divisions provide 
the demand for distinctive representation and the driving force behind the development of 
political parties (e.g., Lipset and Rokkan 1967). To measure this variable, I follow previous 
studies that employ the sum of ethnic and religious fractionalization indices described in 
Alesina et al. (2003). I also control for the log of the average of the ages of parties at each 
election survey, to account for the previous arguments that older democracies tend to have 
more partisans (Dalton and Weldon 2007).14 Other contextual-level economic factors such 
as unemployment and inflation may influence the likelihood that citizens become partisans 
(Hibbs 1989). I also pay attention to important historical context in analyzing the ANES 
data from 1964 to 2008. After the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, social unrest 
and more, the era of partisan dealignment of the late 1960s and 1970s (Bafumi and Shapiro 
2009; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Bartels 2000; Carmines and Stimson 1989; 
Hetherington 2001; Wattenberg 1994) shook up the existing party system as well as the 
                                                            
14  The data on the average age of parties come from the World Bank Database of Political 
Institutions 2012 originally developed by Beck et al. (2001). 
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white southerners’ political orientations. To account for this critical context, I include a 
dummy variable for the dealignment period, in addition to the individual-level covariates 
for southerners and race.15 
Moreover, an individual-level factor such as citizens’ political ideology is likely to 
influence their’ tendencies to become partisans. Given that I focus on whether the 
respondent is a partisan or not, an individual’s ideological strength, rather than the left-
right spectrum, may matter in shaping her party loyalty. I therefore control for how 
ideologically extreme a respondent is.16 According to the dealignment hypothesis, higher 
levels of cognitive resources diminish the role of political parties within the democratic 
process and thus weaken an individual’s partisanship. To account for this argument, I also 
control for the respondent’s level of education.17  Finally, I also control for a set of 
sociodemographic variables: income, gender, and age. 
The hypothesis tested here focuses on how institutional context at the macro level 
shapes the formation of mass partisanship at the micro level; multilevel estimation 
techniques can clarify and explicitly model this relationship. To account for this multilevel 
structure of the data and the dichotomous measure of my dependent variable, I employ the 
following multilevel logit model with a random intercept to analyze the CSES data and the 
                                                            
15 The findings are consistent with the analysis results with an alternative dummy variable that 
accounts for only 1960s, or without this contextual dummy variable. 
16 The ANES survey question that measures ideological self-placement is available only beginning 
in 1972. Following Stegmueller's (2013) advice on the sample size for multilevel analysis, I 
increase the contextual-level sample size into 20 by using feeling thermometers on liberals and 
conservatives available since 1964. The difference between these two feelings thermometers can 
be interpreted as a measure of ideological orientation, as used in previous studies (see, for example, 
Green 1988, and citations therein). Using the measure of ideological self-placement does not 
change the significance of my results. 
17 An ideal measure would be better captured by the respondent’s political sophistication. But due 
to the serious challenge regarding the comparability and reliability across countries and time, 
previous studies have used the level of education given the strong correlation between educational 
attainment and political knowledge. 
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ANES data. This statistical model is weighted using the design and demographic weights 
provided in each dataset along with a weight to address different sample size across survey 
years.  
 
ܮ݋݃ሾ Pr൫ܲܽݎݐ݅ݏܽ݊ݏ݄݅݌௜௝ ൌ 1൯1 െ Pr൫ܲܽݎݐ݅ݏܽ݊ݏ݄݅݌௜௝ ൌ 1൯ሿ 
ൌ	β௝଴ ൅ β௝ூௗ௘௢௟௢௚௜௖௔௟	௦௧௥௘௡௚௧௛	ܫ݀݁݋݈݋݈݃݅ܿܽ	ݏݐݎ݁݊݃ݐ݄௜௝ 	൅ β௝஺௚௘	ܣ݃݁௜௝ 	
൅ β௝ாௗ௨௖௔௧௜௢௡	ܧ݀ݑܿܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝
൅ β௝ூ௡ௗ௜௩௜ௗ௨௔௟_௅௘௩௘௟	஼௢௡௧௥௢௟௦	ܫ݊݀݅ݒ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ_ܮ݁ݒ݈݁	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௝ ൅ ݁௜௝ 
β௝଴ ൌ 	ߛ଴ ൅	ߛூ௡௦௧௜௧௨௧௜௢௔௡௟	஼௢௡௦௧௥௔௜௡௧௦ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ	ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎ݅ܽ݊ݐݏ௝
൅	ߛ௉௔௥௧௬	஺௚௘	ሺ௅௢௚௚௘ௗሻܲܽݎݐݕ	ܣ݃݁	ሺܮ݋݃݃݁݀ሻ௝
൅	ߛௌ௢௖௜௔௟	ு௘௧௘௥௢௚௘௡௘௜௧௬ܵ݋݈ܿ݅ܽ	ܪ݁ݐ݁ݎ݋݃݁݊݁݅ݐݕ௝
൅	ߛீ஽௉	௣௘௥	௖௔௣௜௧௔ܩܦܲ	݌݁ݎ	ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ௝
൅	ߛ஼௢௡௧௘௫௧௨௔௟_௅௘௩௘௟	஼௢௡௧௥௢௟௦ܥ݋݊ݐ݁ݔݐݑ݈ܽ_ܮ݁ݒ݈݁	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝ ൅ ݑ௝଴ 
 
In an analysis of the ANES data, I also include the level-2 (survey-year) mean of the lagged 
dependent variable to account for temporal dynamics, by adapting a standard practice.18 
 
2.5 Analysis Results 
Figure 2.1 plots the proportion of partisans with several key attributes of context variables, 
including the gridlock interval and alternative measures of party polarization, over time in 
the United States. Compared to the measures of party polarization (which are largely 
                                                            
18 The findings are consistent with the analysis results without this temporal dynamics. In fact, the 
magnitude and the statistical significance of the institutional effect are mostly stronger in the 
analysis without this adjustment. 
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increasing), the proportion of partisans and the gridlock interval rise and fall over time. It 
is notable that the proportion of partisans excluding learners, i.e., strong partisans and weak 
partisans, has been largely decreasing while the proportion of partisans including the 
independents who are leaning toward one of the two parties has been fairly stable. Given 
that almost all the previous studies predict that party polarization will lead to the rise of 
partisanship, this counter-intuitive evidence at the aggregate level needs a theoretical 
explanation. Although this pattern does not provide a precise description of the relationship 
between individual partisanship and institutional arrangements, we can see they tend to go 
hand in hand, but largely in the opposite direction.19 
 
Figure 2.1 Partisans, Gridlock, and Polarization in the United States 
 
 
                                                            
19 Given that we are interested in the impact of macro-level institutional context on micro-level 
partisanship, interpreting aggregated data at the individual level can accompany the ecological 
fallacy or ‘Robinson effect’. 
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Table 2.1 Multilevel Logit Model on Institutional Constraints and Mass 
Partisanship 
(NES, 1964-2008) 
 
 
The multilevel analysis results of the ANES data are summarized in Table 2.1. The results 
in the first column of Table 2.1 present empirical evidence that supports my hypothesis. 
US citizens are more likely to become partisans, when gridlock interval shrinks (that is, 
    Gridlock Interval Veto Players  (Number) 
Veto Player  
(Ideological Distance) 
  Coefficient 
Std 
Error 
  
Coefficien
t 
Std 
Error 
  
Coefficient Std Error 
Contextual 
Characteristics            
 Gridlock Interval -0.695 * 0.290         
 
Veto Players 
(Number)    -0.136 * 0.062     
 
Veto Players 
(Ideological 
Distance) 
 
    
-0.133 ** 0.050 
 
Proportion of 
Partisans (Lagged) -0.126  1.198  -1.382  1.142  -1.928  1.067 
 Dealignment Period -0.083  0.064  -0.029  0.060  -0.029  0.054 
 Unemployment -0.038 ** 0.014  -0.023  0.018  -0.032  0.016 
 Inflation -0.029 ** 0.011  -0.027 ** 0.009  -0.055 ** 0.010 
Individual 
Characteristics            
 Ideological Strength 0.443 ** 0.044  0.443 ** 0.044  0.361 ** 0.044 
 Female 0.131 ** 0.031  0.132 ** 0.031  0.197 ** 0.031 
 Age 0.020 ** 0.002  0.020 ** 0.002  0.017 ** 0.002 
 Black 0.077 ** 0.019  0.020 ** 0.002  0.483 ** 0.075 
 Southerner -0.108  0.070  -0.106 * 0.054  -0.105 * 0.054 
 Income 0.107 ** 0.013  0.108 ** 0.013  0.078 ** 0.013 
 Education 0.150 ** 0.012  0.149 ** 0.012  0.089 ** 0.012 
Constant 0.583 ** 0.012  1.519  1.028  1.722  0.961 
Random Effects            
St. Dev. Random 
Intercept 0.078   0.005   0.150   0.032   0.150   0.031 
 Observations 31220   31220   31220  
 Surveys 20   20   20  
  Log-Likelihood -11313.643     -11313.176     -11312.766   
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance.     
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when the institutional configuration makes greater policy change possible). The other 
individual characteristics show the expected effects on the likelihood of becoming partisans: 
more ideologically extreme, and older citizens are more likely to become partisans. 
Note that educated US citizens are more likely to become partisans, consistent with 
recent individual-level analysis results (Albright 2009; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and 
Vanhoutte 2012; Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Vanhoutte 2014; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 
2014; Arzheimer 2015; see also Huber et al. 2005 for a similar result) that contradict the 
effect of cognitive mobilization in Dalton’s dealignment hypothesis. In addition, my results 
show that women are more partisan than men in the United States. On the other hand, I do 
not find any significant effects of other country-level covariates on mass partisanship 
except the negative effect of inflation. 
This correlation between individual partisanship and institutional context still holds 
with alternative measures of institutional constraints: the number of veto players and their 
ideological distance, as represented in the second and third columns of Table 2.1. 
Specifically, citizens are less likely to become partisans, when the number of veto players, 
or the ideological distance among them increases, that is, when there is divided government. 
In particular, party polarization may not automatically translate into resurgence of 
partisanship as existing studies suggest. Instead, when the ideological distance between 
two parties is large and, hence, divided government leads to policy gridlock, citizens are 
less likely to be partisans. Conversely, citizens are more likely to become partisans if one 
political party controls both the legislative and executive branches and, thus, significant 
policy changes are expected. This finding suggests the existing predictions that directly 
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Figure 2.2 Predicted Probability of Becoming a Partisan across Alternative 
Measures of Institutional Constraints 
 
(a) Gridlock Interval 
  
(b) Veto Player: Number 
  
(c) Veto Player: Ideological Distance 
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connect party polarization and the patterns of partisanship should take into account 
institutional context in which partisans form loyalty to their party.  
 Inspection of the model’s predicted probabilities would be a more intuitive way to 
understand the model’s implications. Specifically, based on the information from Table 2.1, 
Figure 2.2 shows the predicted probability of becoming a partisan across alternative 
measures of institutional constraints on policy change, with all other continuous variables 
held at their sample means and ordered variables held at their sample medians. Each panel 
in this figure also shows a simulation-based 95% confidence interval around the predicted 
probabilities. The confidence intervals are calculated by repeatedly drawing a sample of 
model parameter values from the estimated asymptotic sampling distribution (1000 
repetitions).  
The effects of institutional constraints on the probability of a citizen having a party 
attachment are clear from this figure. In my dataset, the predicted probabilities of becoming 
a partisan are 0.86 for the lowest level of gridlock interval (0.177 in 1954) and 0.82 for the 
highest level (0.599 in 2008). The extent of possible changes in the predicted probabilities 
may look small across the ranges of three different measures of institutional constraints, 
these effects are actually significant considering that partisanship is fairly stable in the 
United States.20 Moreover, as in Figure 2.1, the gridlock intervals can change rapidly as a 
result of an election, as do veto players. 
I re-examine the robustness of this dynamic relationship by employing two 
alternative measures of partisanship: 1. a dichotomous measure of partisans excluding 
                                                            
20 As expected, the extent of possible change is much larger when focusing on only the partisans 
who are either strong identifiers or weak identifiers (excluding leaners). The predicted probabilities 
of becoming a partisan are 0.69 and 0.55 respectively for the highest (0.599 in 2008) and the lowest 
level (0.177 in 1954) of the gridlock intervals in my dataset. 
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leaners, and 2. an ordinal measure of the strength of individual partisanship. When focusing 
on only the partisans who are either strong identifiers or weak identifiers, the magnitude of 
the coefficient for the gridlock interval becomes larger, as does its statistical significance 
(see Table 2A.1 in Appendix). In addition, multilevel ordinal logit analysis demonstrates 
that the institutional constraints significantly reduce the strength of citizens’ partisanship 
as well, in a consistent way across the three different measures (gridlock interval, the 
number of veto players, and the ideological distance among them, see Table 2A.2 in 
Appendix). That is, not only citizens are more likely to become partisans, but also they 
develop more solid partisanship when political institutions allow a large extent of policy 
change. 
Can this finding hold outside the United States? To further test the generalizability 
of my account, I shift attention to diverse democracies abroad. First, Figure 2.3 plots the 
proportion of partisans with institutional constraints measured by POLCON at each 
country-year with respect to diverse democracies (114 elections across 49 countries). It 
hints a negative relationship between institutional constraints on policy change and mass 
partisanship across democracies, consistent with the proposed hypothesis. However, again, 
I focus on testing whether individuals are more likely to become partisans where political 
institutions produce greater policy change, using multilevel analysis. 
The statistical analysis of the CSES data confirms the empirical findings from the 
ANES data, as summarized in Table 2.2. The negative and statistically significant 
coefficient associated with POLCON indicates that citizens are less likely to become 
partisans as the institutional constraints on policy change increase. Figure 2.4 represents 
the impact of institutional constraints on partisanship in graphical form, based on this 
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Figure 2.3 Institutional Constraints and Mass Partisanship across Democracies 
 
 
 
 
analysis. Specifically, it shows the predicted probability of becoming a partisan across the 
range of institutional constraints on policy change, with all other continuous variables held 
at their sample means and ordered variables held at their sample medians. 
This figure also shows a simulation-based 95% confidence interval around the 
predicted probability. In the CSES sample, the predicted probability of becoming a partisan 
is only 0.18 for Belgium in 2003 with the highest level of institutional gridlock (POLCON 
= 0.720). For the case of the lowest level of institutional gridlock (POLCON = 0.112), for 
example, Brazil in 2006 in my sample, the predicted probability is 0.40. Given that 
partisanship is fairly stable, particularly in the advanced democracies that make up the 
majority of my samples, Figure 2.4 demonstrates the significant impact of institutional 
context on mass partisanship.  
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Table 2.2. Multilevel Logit Model on Institutional Constraints and Mass Partisanship  
(CSES, Module 1, 2, and 3) 
 
    Coefficient Standard Error 
Contextual Characteristics       
 POLCON -1.751 ** 0.114 
 Party Age (Log) 0.339 ** 0.020 
 Social Heterogeneity -0.179 ** 0.052 
 GDP per capita 0.000 ** 0.000 
 Inflation 0.030 ** 0.002 
 Unemployment 0.017 ** 0.005 
Individual Characteristics    
 Ideological Strength 0.173 ** 0.019 
 Income 0.029 ** 0.008 
 Age 0.002 * 0.001 
 Education -0.038  0.020 
 Female -0.131 ** 0.040 
 Constant -0.610 ** 0.133 
Random Effect    
St. Dev. Random Intercept 0.590   0.016 
  Observations 152906   
 Surveys 114  
  Log-Likelihood -69855547   
Note: ** p < .01, * p < .05. Two-tailed tests of statistical significance. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Institutional Constraints and Predicted Probability of Becoming a Partisan  
 
 
 
Additionally, the effect of Party Age (logged) is positive and statistically significant, 
consistent with the previous expectation. The older, presumably more institutionalized the 
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party system, the more citizens become partisans. On the other hand, Social Heterogeneity 
is negatively associated with the likelihood of becoming partisans.21 With respect to the 
dealignment hypothesis, the effect of socio-economic development (measured by the GDP 
per capita) on individual-level partisanship is statistically significant, but its magnitude is 
minimal when analyzed in a broad sample of diverse democracies. Moreover, I find no 
evidence that education discourages party attachment, in contrast to the implication of the 
previous argument that cognitive resources would weaken an individual’s partisanship. 
The other individual-level covariates also show the expected effects on the likelihood of 
becoming partisans, except the effects of female. In the CSES data, women are less partisan 
than men. 
Put together, greater institutional constraints on policy change significantly 
decrease the probability of becoming a partisan, and this finding holds for alternative 
measures, different statistical models, and different data sources that cover both the United 
States and diverse democracies, even after taking into account important existing 
explanations. This empirical evidence bolsters my institutional account of partisanship. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Previous studies on mass partisanship have rarely paid attention to institutional 
dynamics despite the critical roles political institutions serve in determining the party 
                                                            
21 This result is somewhat unexpected. In fact, the previous studies report inconsistent results 
regarding the impact of the social divisions. While Huber et al. (2005) find a positive and 
statistically significant effect, Lupu (2014) finds no such evidence. He points out the countervailing 
effect of social heterogeneity. That is, if social groups like unions, or ethnic groups are also 
associated with political parties, then membership in these groups can encourage citizens to identify 
with parties. On the other hand, if multiple membership in these social groups cross-pressures 
citizens, they may not encourage partisanship.  
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differentials and, in turn, mass partisanship. My institutional approach offers an alternative 
and generalizable explanation for the variation in mass partisanship over time in the United 
States and across countries. Political institutions at the macro level can affect mass 
partisanship at the micro level as they shape the extent of policy change. A citizen’s 
estimate of the utility-differential between the parties is increased under the institutional 
context where larger degrees of policy changes are possible. By connecting alternative 
behavioral theories on partisanship with institutional analysis, I find that as the institutional 
constraints on policy change increase, citizens are less likely to become partisans, using 
multilevel analyses of two large-scale survey data that cover the US (1964-2008) as well 
as 114 election surveys across 49 countries. I scrutinize the robustness of this systematic 
relationship between institutional configurations and partisanship using alternative 
measures and statistical models. 
This approach enables us to explain the patterns of partisanship across diverse 
democracies in a consistent way regardless of the level of their institutional complexity, 
providing the broadest empirical examination yet conducted on this question. It departs 
from most existing studies that mainly focus on U.S. politics or only the advanced 
democracies and exclude new democracies. My institutional account can explain important 
temporal variation in partisanship in the United States, and it can be applied to explain 
much broader contextual variation existing in diverse democracies including new 
democracies. Given the existing arguments that partisanship may signal the development 
of stable party system and democratic consolidation, my analysis may contribute to a 
broader literature.  
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My institutional framework is also compatible with alternative conceptualizations 
of partisanship, from rational-choice models to social identity theory to a theory of 
motivated reasoning. In this approach, I incorporate the policy dimension into our 
understanding of partisanship by emphasizing the significant role of political institutions 
in constraining or facilitating policy change. Partisans do care about policy outcomes and 
those outcomes are significantly determined by the institutional configurations.   
In particular, my account also brings a new perspective to the recent debate over 
the impact of party polarization on public opinion. While almost all the previous studies 
predict that party polarization would accompany the rise of mass partisanship, this 
prediction stands in contrast to the empirical observation that mass partisanship at the 
aggregate level has been fairly stable, if not in decline, over time in the United States 
despite the unprecedented polarization between the two major parties.22 I offer both the 
theoretical explanation and empirical evidence that party polarization may not always lead 
to the rise of mass partisanship; rather such polarization can actually lead to the decline of 
mass partisanship as a result of its interplay with institutional configurations, and 
subsequent policy gridlock. 
That is, when the polarization of key institutional actors such as political parties, or 
pivotal actors leads to policy stability, mass partisanship is likely to be reduced. Consistent 
with the prior studies, party polarization may lead to greater mass partisanship, but only 
under certain conditions. For example, when the same political party controls both 
Congress and the White House in the United States (to be more precise, when you have 
fewer number of veto players or, when the gridlock interval is very small and does not 
                                                            
22 See also Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 
2005 for the finding that the American public is no more polarized today than before.  
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include the status quo policy) and thus sweeping policy changes are possible, people are 
likely to be partisan. However, especially in the context of the United States, polarization 
is more likely to produce more gridlock and less policy change during periods of divided 
government. This relative policy stability can decrease the likelihood that one becomes a 
partisan by decreasing his or her estimate of party differential. Thus, my alternative 
approach predicts that the impact of party polarization on the mass partisanship depends 
on its interaction between the structure and the preference configuration of political 
institutions. In particular, given the important disparity between actual and predicted 
patterns of partisanship in the United States, my account suggests the unexplored 
countervailing process that party polarization can constrain the resurgence of partisanship 
and even lead to partisan decline. This article demonstrate how two lines of research that 
have been studied separately can meet and how such theoretical connection can provide 
new insights to reshape our previous understanding of partisanship and to better address an 
important current issue such as the impact of political polarization on public opinion. 
Scholars should recognize the institutional dynamics and policy consequences that party 
polarization generates.  
My results point to several potential areas for future research. First, further research 
needs to verify the causal links that connect the macro-level institutional context to the 
meso-level policy outcomes to the micro-level partisanship. Although the most recent 
studies report some promising results that citizens can infer the policy implications from a 
given institutional context (Vowles 2010; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Hahm 2015), 
much work remains. For example, there are theoretical reasons to believe that the effects 
of political context should depend on other important covariates including political 
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sophistication (e.g., Huber et al. 2005). Also, future studies need to examine whether such 
institutional attributes also shape the impact of partisanship on other political beliefs and 
actions, not only the magnitude of mass partisanship. Considering a broad spectrum of 
studies that document the pervasive influence of partisanship, we might ask whether we 
can also find the systematic relationship between institutional context and various 
behavioral outcomes generated by partisan bias. The studies that attempt to address these 
questions would help us construct a more complete picture of the nature and the extent of 
partisanship that can affect important political actions and policy outcomes.  
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Appendix 2A 
 
 
Table 2A.1 Multilevel Logit Model on Institutional Constraints and Mass 
Partisanship: Alternative Dependent Variable - Partisans excluding Leaners  
(NES, 1964-2008) 
 
 
 
     Institutional Constraint Model (Partisans Excluding Leaners) 
  Coeff SE P-value 
Contextual Characteristics    
  Gridlock Interval -1.326 0.439 0.003 
  Proportion of Partisans (Lagged) -0.793 1.88 0.673 
  Unemployment -0.024 0.041 0.547 
Inflation -0.033 0.014 0.021 
Dealignment Period -0.089 0.064 0.168 
Individual Characteristics    
  Ideological Strength 0.233 0.029 0.000 
  Female 0.254 0.037 0.000 
  Age 0.02 0.001 0.000 
  Black 0.575 0.065 0.000 
  Income 0.065 0.017 0.000 
  Education 0.008 0.011 0.488 
Constant 0.562 1.91 0.769 
Random Effects    
St. Dev. Random Intercept 0.091 0.005  
   Observations 31220     
  Surveys 20   
   Log-Likelihood -19614.308     
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Table 2A.2 Multilevel Model on Institutional Constraints and Partisan Strength: 
Alternative Estimation on the Ordinal Measure - Multilevel Ordinal Logistic Model 
(NES, 1964-2008) 
 
    Gridlock Interval   Veto Player (Number)   Veto Player (Ideological Distance) 
  Coeff. SE P-value   Coeff. SE 
P-
value   Coeff. SE 
P-
value
Contextual 
Characteristics            
 Gridlock Interval -0.533 0.189 0.005        
 
Veto Players 
(Number)     -0.105 0.056 0.062     
 
Veto Players 
(Ideological 
Distance) 
    
   
 
-0.058 0.031 0.061
 
Proportion of 
Partisans (Lagged) -0.033 0.123 0.790 -0.033 0.124 0.791  -0.032 0.124 0.796
 Unemployment -0.007 0.016 0.672 -0.004 0.018 0.829  -0.003 0.018 0.863
 Inflation -0.032 0.009 0.000 -0.025 0.009 0.004  -0.025 0.009 0.004
Individual 
Characteristics            
 
Ideological 
Strength 0.161 0.008 0.000 0.160 0.008 0.000  0.160 0.008 0.000
 Female 0.117 0.012 0.000 0.118 0.012 0.000  0.118 0.012 0.000
 Age 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000  0.009 0.000 0.000
 Income 0.008 0.006 0.169 0.008 0.006 0.152  0.008 0.006 0.151
 Unemployed -0.024 0.024 0.311 -0.025 0.024 0.300  -0.025 0.024 0.300
 Education -0.011 0.004 0.008 -0.011 0.004 0.005  -0.011 0.004 0.005
Constant 1.318 0.292 0.000 1.242 0.294 0.000  1.084 0.272 0.000
Random Effects            
St. Dev. Random 
Intercept 0.096 0.003  0.335 0.004  0.335 0.004
  Observations 26416       26416       26416     
 Surveys 20 20 20 
  Log-Likelihood -36258.103    
-36259.937 
   
-36259.930 
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Chapter III 
 
Change Partisans Can Believe In:  
Policy Change, Cues, and Partisan Beliefs 
 
 
Abstract  
Although the premise that the public can understand the policy implications of institutional 
attributes is central to many existing studies that connect political institutions and political 
behavior, this crucial assumption has not been fully scrutinized. Using a survey experiment 
over a large number of U.S. adults, I provide empirical evidence, in contrast to the well-
established finding of citizen ignorance, that citizens infer the policy implications from the 
given institutional context, using “institutional cues” and “elite cues.” In particular, I find 
that Americans can shape expectations of policy change by relying on easily observable 
institutional characteristics such as divided government versus unified government in 
combination with elites’ opinions about expected policy change. Moreover, my findings 
show that this expectation of policy change strengthens partisan beliefs. These findings 
contribute to the literature on partisanship and an increasing number of studies that focus 
on institutional context in the field of comparative political behavior. 
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3.1 Introduction 
A line of research centers on the premise that the public can perceive the extent of policy 
change from the given institutional context. For example, according to Downs (1957), 
voters make their vote choices, and other political decisions, based on their assessments of 
the similarity between their positions and those of the candidates, or parties. Downs himself 
(1957, 39) notes, however, that “if he is rational, he knows that no party will be able to do 
everything that it says it will do. Hence, he cannot merely compare platforms; instead he 
must estimate in his own mind what the parties would actually do were they in power” 
(Downs 1957, 39). Fiorina (1992, 64) states that the literature on policy balancing 
“presume[s] that some citizens have a general appreciation of the institutional structure of 
American government and that such institutional considerations enter into their voting 
decision”. In her comparative studies on parliamentary democracies, Kedar (2005a, 187) 
also “assume[s] that voters hold a belief about the prospects and nature of power sharing 
— a belief as to whether the party winning the prime ministry will be able to govern alone 
or will need to bargain with others — as well as about the distribution of power among 
parties.” In addition, a growing body of cross-national research that examines the effects 
of institutional contexts on political behavior also builds on the implicit premise that people 
can perceive and thus respond to the incentives and constraints provided by political 
institutions (e.g., Anderson 1997; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hellwig 2002; Huber, Kernell, 
and Leoni 2005 ; Powell and Whitten 1993; Rudolph 2003). However, this premise has 
rarely been under theoretical and empirical scrutiny. 
Can citizens understand how institutions work, or the policy implications of the 
given institutional context, and how? What are the behavioral implications of this 
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understanding? Considering that decades of behavioral research finds, with few exceptions, 
a highly uninformed citizenry (e.g., Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), the 
complexity of policy making process and institutional structure may further fuel skepticism 
about citizens’ abilities to understand the policy implications of institutional structure. In 
this article, I view citizens as “cognitive misers” (Hewstone and Macrae 1994) who attempt 
to make efficient decisions under circumstances of limited information, limited ability to 
process information, and limited incentives to become politically engaged (Downs 1957; 
Popkin 1991). Citizens achieve this low-information rationality through the use of 
information shortcuts or heuristics (Delli Carpini 2009, 28; Popkin 1991). Accordingly, the 
literature documents the influences of various forms of heuristics, including opinion 
leaders (Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee 1954; Druckman 2001; Kuklinski and Hurley 
1994: Mondak 1993a; Mondak 1993b; Nicholson 2011), party labels (e.g., Cohen 2003; 
Downs 1957; Rahn 1993), interest groups (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Lupia 1994), and 
the media (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987).  
This article examines how two distinct types of cues – what I call ‘institutional cues’ 
and ‘elite cues’ – available in institutional context enable citizens to shape their 
understanding of policy change, and how such perceptions affect partisan beliefs. In 
particular, I present a survey experiment that isolates the effects of both cues based on a 
large sample of U.S. adults whose demographics closely resemble the U.S. adult population. 
My experimental design permits direct evaluation of the relative impact of two cues, their 
interactive effect on policy perception, and subsequent consequences for partisan beliefs.  
I find that citizens shape their policy perceptions in the given institutional context 
by relying on both cues regarding institutional attributes and cues from political elites, 
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challenging the longstanding yet dim view of citizen competence in the context of complex 
policy making processes. While easily accessible and direct elite opinions play a large role 
in forming citizens’ perceptions, a relatively indirect cue that requires moderate 
informational processing shows a consistent effect as well. I also find that citizens use both 
cues effectively, rather than attending to the most effective cues while ignoring others. 
Lastly, the findings show that public perceptions of policy change strengthen partisan 
beliefs, suggesting micro-level foundations to link macro-level institutional arrangements 
and partisan behavior, one of the most studied forms of political behavior. Together, my 
findings not only advance our theoretical and empirical understanding about how citizens 
understand institutions and process but also illustrate why this research agenda merits 
further study. My study expands the scope of behavioral research that incorporates the role 
of institutional setting for policy making and provides the micro-foundation of a growing 
body of works that link political institutions and mass behavior. 
This article is organized as follows. I first begin with a review of the literature that 
both motivates the study and provides its theoretical underpinnings. I then propose testable 
hypotheses and describe my data and methods. The last two sections present the results and 
discuss their implications for understandings citizens’ capabilities to perceive the policy 
implications of institutional arrangements and their effects on partisan beliefs.  
 
3.2 Institutional Cues, Elite Cues, and Perception of Policy Change 
The policy-making process is inherently complex. It invites various political and social 
actors with different interests and ideas, and their interactions generate multifaceted 
dynamics within the rules and procedures structured by a broader institutional context. 
59 
Thus, understanding different policy making contexts and their consequences has been a 
major task for many political scientists, and numerous scholars have proposed different 
and competing explanations to understand this process. In the field of American politics, 
since Mayhew’s (1991) seminal work on divided government, many scholars have paid 
attention to the theoretical and empirical significance of political institutions in terms of 
their ability to change the policy of the status quo (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; 
Binder 1999; Coleman 1999; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003). In the field of comparative 
politics, Tsebelis (1995; 2002) develops a veto-players theory that provides an analytical 
framework to compare the ways diverse institutional arrangements generate policy stability 
(or instability) (see also Cox and McCubbins 2001). While there is a growing theoretical 
consensus that explains policy stability as a function of the array of preferences of key 
institutional actors, known as veto players or pivotal voters, and the location of the status 
quo, it would be very difficult to expect that any citizen can obtain and understand the 
detailed information and sufficient knowledge that is necessary to make a precise 
prediction of policy change, as political scientists do.  
However, citizens may derive the best estimates from a wide range of potential 
heuristics and shortcuts either directly or indirectly from the given institutional context. 
Explanations of the processes by which citizens achieve the low-information rationality are 
grounded in dual process models of persuasion. Despite the nuanced difference between 
the two common models, such as the elaboration likelihood (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) and 
heuristic-systematic (Chaiken 1980) models, the literature of social psychology is 
grounded in dual-process models that differentiates two distinct processes involving in 
information processing: one process involves mindful and systematic processing of 
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substantive issue-relevant information, and the other entails the activation and application 
of heuristics and shortcuts. Given this nature, systematic processing requires both cognitive 
ability and capacity whereas heuristic processing requires relatively minimal cognitive 
demands. Given the established finding that most citizens lack knowledge of and interest 
in politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), these models suggest that 
heuristic processing and contextual cues from political elites, experts, and the political 
environment may enable citizens to understand political institutions and policy making 
process (see Lupia and McCubbins. 1998; Popkin 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 
1991). 
This study pays particular attention to two types of cues that can shape citizens’ 
perceptions of policy change from the given institutional context. First, citizens can use 
statements by mass media, elected officials, or political experts as cues. Political elites 
provide “messages people use to infer other information and, by extension, to make 
decisions” (Bullock 2011, 497). Even though citizens cannot and do not calculate the so-
called “gridlock interval” or the number of veto players of the current government, many 
Americans might have understood that the policy gridlock would result from the partisan 
control of the separate branches of government, when media and experts constantly 
reported on the federal government shutdown in October 2013. 23  Well-established 
literature demonstrates that even the least-well-informed citizens are able to make fairly 
                                                            
23 The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted Oct. 17-20 among 1,001 adults, 
finds that interest in the government shutdown rose steadily in the preceding month. In mid-
September, 25% were paying very close attention to Congress working on an agreement to avoid a 
shutdown; interest reached 43% in early October, when the government closed its doors, and nearly 
half closely followed news about the end of the 16-day government shutdown (“Public Closely 
Tracks Agreement on Shutdown and Debt Limit High News Interest in Shutdown and Debt Limit 
Debate” http://www.people-press.org/2013/10/22/public-closely-tracks-agreement-on-shutdown-
and-debt-limit). 
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reliable political judgments by relying on cues from various political elites, including 
opinion leaders (Druckman 2001; Kuklinski and Hurley 1994: Mondak 1993a; Mondak 
1993b; Nicholson 2011; see also Berelson, Lazarfeld, and McPhee 1954), the media 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987), political parties (Brader 
and Tucker 2012; 2013; Bullock 2011; Cohen 2003; Kam 2005; Rahn 1993), or interest 
groups (Bowler and Donovan 1998; Lupia 1994). 
Second, citizens can also use the characteristics of political institutions as a 
heuristic to make inferences about potential policy change. For example, Fiorina (1992) 
argues that recent experience with divided control of government may give some voters 
both an incentive and a heuristic to assess political parties based on how the different 
branches’ powers, in combination with political parties’ positions, will produce policy 
outcomes. Lacy and Paolino (1998) find evidence that voters consider the power and issue 
positions of the executive and the legislature in their vote choices. Moreover, several recent 
studies directly examine the institutional sources of heuristic reasoning. Armstrong and 
Duch (2010) claim that voters use historical regularities in cabinet participation to 
anticipate which governing coalitions will form and make vote choice accordingly. 
Fortunato and his colleagues (Fortunato and Stevenson 2013; Fortunato and Adams 2015) 
demonstrate that voters infer parties’ left-right positions (rather than automatically accept 
what parties promise) 24  from the composition of the national governing coalition. In 
particular, by analyzing 18 European countries, Fortunato and Stevenson (2013) find that 
                                                            
24 Adams, Ezrow, Somer-Topcu’s (2011) also find that citizens shape their own perceptions of the 
parties’ positions, and do not directly accept parties’ policy statements.  
62 
voters use coalition partnership as a heuristic to infer the direction of policy change in the 
absence of detailed information about parties’ legislative records.25  
For a heuristic to be useful, it should be both cheap to obtain (relative to the cost of 
learning about the actual policy-making process) and relatively accurate (at least on 
average) (Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 952; Fortunato and Stevenson 2013, 463). In the context 
of American politics, easily observable institutional characteristics, such as whether a 
President comes from the same political party that controls Congress, may give them a 
sense of expected policy change,26 even if the literature, to be precise, suggests that policy 
changes may be possible, even under divided government, if the ideological distance 
between the executive and the legislature is small, and the status quo is far away from all 
veto players (Tsebelis 2002), or if pivotal voters constitute a small gridlock interval 
(Krehbiel 1998).  
While existing studies offer theoretical and empirical grounds for positing that elite 
cues and institutional cues enable citizens to understand institutions and policy making 
processes, there are at least three important aspects that need further study. First, there is 
well-established literature on the influence of elite cues, but how they can enable citizens 
understand institutions and policy making has rarely been studied. Second, despite 
increasing work on institutional cues, almost all the studies are based on evidence from 
observational data, and direct evidence is lacking. In this light, this article contributes to 
                                                            
25 See also Adams, Ezrow, Wlezien (2015) for an application of a similar logic to the topic of 
European integration. 
26 Indeed, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 69) report an interesting finding that citizens’ knowledge 
about institutions and process is relatively high, compared to the other areas including political 
leaders, domestic politics, and foreign affairs. They explained that it is consistent with the fact that 
institutions and processes tend to be fairly stable and thus require less regular monitoring and they 
are the domain consistently taught in the schools. 
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the existing studies by directly manipulating the institutional cues and evaluating their 
effects in comparison with elite cues, whose effects are well established by experimental 
studies.   
Lastly, reliance on cues is more efficient for the recipient of the message than 
assembling and processing all the necessary information. However, cues or shortcuts can 
vary widely in terms of their utilities, functions, and credibility, among other things. 
Specifically, institutional cues are indirect in the sense that the attributes of institutional 
arrangements themselves do not directly reveal the implications of policy consequences. 
Thus, they require relatively more motivation and/or cognitive resources to process 
compared to elite cues, which are relatively direct and easy to process. On the other hand, 
institutional cues are less subjective than elite cues, as the former derives from the objective 
characteristics of given political objects an individual is evaluating. In contrast, the utility 
of the latter depends heavily on the source’s credibility (e.g., Druckman 2001; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1998; see also Hovland and Weiss 1951). The credibility may vary with the 
sources’ “knowledgeability” and “trustworthiness” (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). That 
said, citizens can use multiple cues – often consistent or congruent, but sometimes 
conflicting or competitive – to make political judgments. While this straightforward idea 
seems very intuitive, it demands further theoretical and empirical support in the context of 
existing studies. For example, Lupia and McCubbins (1998, 29) state that “people have an 
incentive to ignore many stimuli” and thus, “[i]f there are more shortcuts available than a 
person can attend to, then he or she attends to the shortcut that is cheapest and most highly 
correlated with pleasure and pain.” Gigerenzer and colleague’s ‘‘fast and frugal heuristics’’ 
offers another plausible account of why people may not use multiple cues (Gigerenzer, 
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Todd, and the ABC Research Group 1999). According to them, people use the boundedly-
rational “Take-The-Best” heuristic (TTB). In particular, people rank cues according to 
predictive accuracy – what Gigerenzer and colleagues refer to as ‘‘cue validity’’ – and take 
the ‘‘best’’ piece of information (e.g., the most informative) while ‘‘ignoring the rest.’’ In 
a similar vein, although there has not been much research in political science examining 
multiple heuristics (see Chong and Druckman 2007; Nicholson 2011, as exceptions),27 
most of studies concentrate on the question of whether one dominates the other. This line 
of logic may suggest that people rely largely on elite cues that are more direct and easily 
accessible, but ignore other cues. To the extent that one cue plays a large role in shaping 
perceptions, another cue is less likely to be used.  
This article, instead, pays attention to the presence of multiple dimensions in which 
cues are evaluated, and thus the possibility that one cue can reinforce or interfere with the 
other cue(s). To this end, I propose an experiment that isolates and compares the effects of 
both the institutional cue and the elite cue. I further examine the effects of congruent versus 
conflicting cues by analyzing the interactions of two types of political cues in shaping the 
perception of policy change. To summarize, the key hypotheses derived from the 
discussion above are as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals are more likely to perceive possible policy change when 
institutional cues are available.28 
                                                            
27 Instead, most studies pay attention to the relative effect of cues and information – rather than 
competing cues or heuristics – and suggest that one dominates the other (e.g., Arceneaux 2008; 
Bullock 2011; Cohen 2003; Nicholson 2011; Rahn 1993; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). 
28 That is, individuals are more likely to perceive significant policy changes when the cue of divided 
government is presented; they are less likely when the cues of unified government is presented. 
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Hypothesis 2: Individuals are more likely to perceive possible policy change when elite 
cues are available.29 
 
Hypothesis 3: Elite cues are more effective than institutional cues in shaping the perception 
of policy change.  
 
Hypothesis 4a: The effects of institutional cues on policy perception increase when 
consistent institutional cues are available.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The effects of elite cues on policy perception increase when consistent 
institutional cues are available.  
 
3.3 Perception of Policy Change, and Partisan Beliefs 
Once citizens infer the expected policy change based on institutional cues or elite cues, this 
reasoning process can exert a significant influence on their partisan beliefs. In fact, the 
rational-choice perspective, such as Bayesian models proposed by Achen (1992) and 
Gerber and Green (1998), equates partisanship with Downs’ core concept of “expected 
party differential.” This notion derives from the comparison of the expected utilities an 
                                                            
Note that the institutional cues are coded as -1 (divided government), 0 (no institutional cues), and 
1 (unified government) to reflect the direction of the information. 
29 Thus, individuals are more likely to perceive significant policy changes when the elite cue of 
policy change is presented; they are less likely when the elite cue of the status quo is presented. 
Similar to institutional cues, elite cues are coded as -1 (status quo), 0 (no elite cues), and 1 (policy 
change) to reflect the direction of the information. 
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individual would receive if each party were in office. If citizens perceive greater constraints 
on the extent of policy change, they are likely to know that the political party in power may 
matter less, as the comparative benefits of supporting one party over the other decrease. 
Conversely, to the extent to which significant policy changes are possible, the party in 
power is more likely to reach outcomes as close as possible to its ideal points. Subsequently, 
the question of which party holds power is more likely to matter, and subsequent partisan 
reasoning can be intensified. 
While this notion of party differential has been primarily discussed against social-
psychological studies, it is theoretically compatible with different conceptualizations of 
partisanship. According to social identity theory, a sense of identity takes place through 
social categorization through which individuals define who they are and who others are 
(e.g., Tajfel and Turner 1979). Although this literature – specifically, what is known as the 
minimal group paradigm – demonstrates that mere categorization based on an arbitrary 
criterion is sufficient to produce discriminatory intergroup behaviors in the form of ingroup 
favoritism, its goal is not to deny the role of objective conflicts of interest. Tajfel (1981, 
223) himself asserts that “this theory cannot replace the economic and social analysis, but 
must be used to supplement it.” When such categorization is combined with the real 
conflicts of group interests, such identification can be further strengthened. Insomuch as 
policy gridlock decreases a comparative benefit of a citizen’s party, he or she is less likely 
to form strong identity with his or her party over the others. To the contrary, the greater 
utility differential between the parties can make us better distinguish/categorize “our party” 
versus “their parties,” and to form positive attachments toward “our party.” 
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Theories of motivated reasoning anticipate that people are always constrained by 
their partisan predispositions, even when they try to be accurate (Lodge and Taber 2000; 
Taber and Lodge 2006; see also Kunda 1990). “Partisan goals,” (or “directional goals”), 
which motivate people to apply their reasoning powers in defense of a prior belief, bias not 
only citizens’ judgments but also the process through which those judgments are reached 
(Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006; Westen et al. 2006). “The tension between 
the drives for accuracy and belief perseverance underlies all human reasoning” (Taber and 
Lodge 2006, 756). However, people tend to believe what they wish only to the extent they 
feel the evidence could satisfy the other category of motives, accuracy goals (Groenendyk 
2009; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Taber and Lodge 2006). That is, motivated 
reasoning would be contingent on one’s capacity to justify or rationalize that judgment. 
“When one wants to draw a particular conclusion, one feels obligated to construct a 
justification for that conclusion that would be plausible to a dispassionate observer” 
(Kunda 1990, 493). Thus, clearer party differentials can serve as this justification for an 
individual’s leaning toward his or her partisan predisposition. Conversely, when a citizen 
perceives little party differential, all but the most fervent partisans would find it difficult to 
construct seemingly reasonable justifications for her partisan leaning. 
 In sum, the policy perceptions citizens derive from the given institutional context 
can shape their partisan beliefs. This theoretical expectation is particularly important in the 
sense that the existing studies that incorporate the policy implications of political 
institutions mostly limit their attention only to voting behavior (Fiorina 1992; Lacy and 
Paolino 1998; Kedar 2005). This article claims that partisan beliefs should vary with 
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perceptions of policy change that an individual derives from available institutional cues 
and/or elite cues. This suggests the following hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 5: When partisans expect larger extent of policy change, they are more likely 
to form partisan beliefs.  
 
3.4 Experimental Design 
I design and employ a novel experimental design by revising the parallel encouragement 
design. Under the parallel encouragement design, each subject is first randomly assigned 
to one of two groups. Then, for one group, the treatment is randomly assigned but no 
manipulation of mediator is conducted. For the other group, the researcher randomizes the 
treatment and the indirect manipulation to change the level of mediator. After the treatment, 
the mediator and the dependent variable are measured.30 Note that this design, which is in 
the box with dotted line, resembles the 2 x 3 factorial design, as shown in Figure 3.1.31 By  
                                                            
30 Comparatively, under the parallel design, each subject is first randomly assigned to one of two 
experiments; in one experiment only the treatment variable is randomized whereas in the other both 
treatment and the mediator are randomized (rather than encouraged). Imai et al. (2013, 6) note its 
two disadvantages compared to the parallel encouragement design. First, it is often difficult to 
manipulate the mediator perfectly. Second, even if such a manipulation is possible, the use of these 
designs requires the consistency assumption that the manipulation of the mediator should not affect 
the outcome through any pathway other than the mediator. Instead, the parallel encouragement 
design, as Imai and his colleagues demonstrate, has the potential to significantly improve the 
identification power of the previous Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach to what they call the 
single-experiment design by directly manipulating the intermediate variable that lies on the causal 
path from the treatment to the outcome (Imai et al. 2013). 
31 Of course, the main variables in two different experimental designs are conceptualized and 
theorized in different ways. The major focus of this study views two cues as distinct factors that 
shape expectations of policy change, and incorporate this information in identifying the impact of 
such perception on partisan beliefs. On the other hand, under the parallel encouragement design, 
the treatment would be the institutional attributes (divided government vs. unified government), 
and the perception of policy change is encouraged by the priming procedure where we provide the 
elite opinions about expected policy change. However, the resemblance of the manipulations across 
the two designs enables me to combine them into a single experimental design.   
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Figure 3.1 Experimental Design 
 
 
 
adding two additional conditions, which are outside the box with dotted line, I incorporate 
this design into the ten-condition, between-subject experiment, which corresponds to 3 
[institutional cues] × 3 [elite cues] factorial design that lacks one condition where both cues 
are not presented. Given that this study varies the levels of both factors (from no 
institutional cues to the institutional cue of either divided government or unified 
government; from no elite cues to the elite cue of either the status quo or policy change), 
such a modification does not preclude a test of the available cues and the dependent 
variables of interest.32  
One unique utility of this revised experimental design is that it enables us to conduct 
alternative statistical analyses of dynamic relationships among the main variables of 
interest. By embedding this experiment into the factorial design, I can test not only the 
                                                            
32 In the interest of simplicity, powered test, or research focus, scholars often exclude the control 
condition without any relevant information from the analysis (e.g., Chong and Druckman 2013; 
Levendusky and Malhotra 2015) 
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interaction effects between two cues, which is the main focus of the study, but also an 
alternative mediation relationship where information of institutional attributes may affect 
partisan beliefs through the perception of policy change as a mediator.  
In addition, this design allows statistical analysis to overcome challenges of so-
called encouragement designs. Given that the focus of the second part of this study is 
estimating the role of perception of policy change, subjects are only encouraged to perceive 
(rather than assigned to) certain levels of policy change. I utilize the experimental setup 
where cues to facilitate the subject’s policy perception are randomly assigned and correct 
for the noncompliance issues inherent in experimental studies using the encouragement 
design.  
In the survey experiment, all subjects receive short descriptions of an upcoming 
election with one of eight scenarios that reflect the conditions in Figure 3.1. These 
scenarios are designed to be as equivalent as possible, but vary in terms of whether they 
include institutional cues (divided government vs. unified government), elite cues 
(opinions about significant policy changes or the status quo), or both. Specifically, in the 
“institutional cue only” treatment groups, subjects are presented with a hypothetical 
scenario describing only the basic characteristics of the institutional context: divided 
government versus unified government in the given context of American politics. For 
example, Institutional Cue (Divided Government) × No Elite Cue group subjects read the 
following: 
 
We would like to know your thoughts about an upcoming election. Please read 
the brief description that follows, and then, we will ask you several questions 
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about what you read.  The 2016 United States elections will be held on Tuesday, 
November 8, 2016. At that time, the President of the United States will be 
elected. In addition, all 435 seats in the United States House of Representatives 
and 34 of the 100 seats in the United States Senate will be contested.    
 
Suppose that we have a President from one political party and Congress 
controlled by another (For example, a President from the Republican Party 
while Congress controlled by the Democratic Party, or a President from the 
Democratic Party while Congress controlled by the Republican Party), as a 
result of the 2016 election.  
 
Immediately after reading the description, participants are then asked to provide their 
subjective perceptions regarding the extent of policy change. Next, they are asked to 
rate how they feel towards the two major political parties on a scale of 0 to 100, and 
provide their opinions about party leaders’ willing to compromise (see Appendix 
2A.1 for detail). 
On the other hand, in the “elite cue only” conditions, subjects will read party 
leaders’ acknowledgement of difficulty in making policy changes (vs. their 
commitment to make policy changes) and experts’ opinions that reflect such 
expectations. For example, right after the same brief description of an upcoming 
election, No Institutional Cue × Elite Cue (Status Quo) group subjects read the 
following: 
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Leading Republicans and Democrats have acknowledged that even if their 
party wins control, it would remain very difficult to make substantial 
changes on major issues that have been stalled in recent years. Experts 
predict that, as a result of the 2016 election, there will be few, if any, 
significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, health 
care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, 
no matter who wins the White House and Congress. 
  
In the “institutional cue + elite cue” conditions, subjects receive both the institutional cues 
and elite cues provided in the other conditions, with different combinations regarding the 
expected policy change. Thus, subjects in these groups can face both consistent cues and 
conflicting cues. For example, while subjects in the Institutional Cue (Divided Government) 
× Elite Cue (Status Quo) group receive cues about divided government and face reinforcing 
elite opinions, subjects in the Institutional Cue (Divided Government)  × Elite Cue (Policy 
Change) receive cues of divided government with conflicting elite opinions. This 
experimental setting allows not only to isolate the effects of two cues but also to examine 
their interactive effects. (see Appendix 2A.1 for actual questions and description of stimuli) 
To examine how institutional cues and elite cues affect public perceptions of policy 
change, and further analyze the subsequent consequences on partisan beliefs, I create 
several key variables. The main dependent variable of the first analysis is Perception of 
Policy Change, which serves as a key independent variable in the second analysis. This 
variable is coded as a five-point scale: 0 for subjects who think there will not be any 
significant policy changes, but 5 for those who think there will be complete policy changes 
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(0 for “Not at all,” 1 “A little,” 2 “A moderate amount,” 3 “A lot,” and 4 “Completely”). 
The dependent variables of the second analysis are In-Group Favoritism and Opposition 
to Compromise, which capture the extent of partisan beliefs of subjects who perceive 
different levels of policy change. The first variable, In-Group Favoritism is constructed 
from the commonly used feeling thermometer toward parties. This measure ranges from 0 
to 100. Zero means very unfavorable and 100 means very favorable. Fifty means a subject 
does not feel favorable or unfavorable. By incorporating the subject’s party identification 
measure, this variable measures the subject’s feeling toward the party he or she identifies 
with. 33  Thus, subjects who identify as independents are missing from this variable. 
Opposition to Compromise is a variable that measures the subject’s attitudes toward party 
leaders’ willing to make compromises (or opposition to compromise) on a seven-category 
scale ranging from “more important to compromise” (coded as 0) to “more important to 
stick to their beliefs” (coded as 6). I also construct a Partisan Beliefs index by incorporating 
these two indicators through simple averaging, reflecting the expectation that each element 
of the index is partially substitutable. 
Main independent variables are coded to reflect the direction of the information 
embedded in institutional cues and elite cues. For example, Institutional Cues (Unified 
Government) is coded as 1 while No Institutional Cues as 0, and Institutional Cues (Divided 
                                                            
33 I focus on in-group favoritism in light of the literature that emphasizes the primacy of in-group 
favoritism (e.g., Allport 1954) and claims that in-group favoritism should be distinguished from 
out-group derogation (See Brewer 1999; see also Levin & Sidanius 1999, Singh et al. 1998). 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Subjects 
  Observations Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Democrats 552 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Republicans 552 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Age 552 45.82 15.85 18 87 
Education 534 3.33 1.03 1 7 
Woman 552 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Black 552 0.09 0.28 0 1 
White 552 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Income 530 4.78 3.45 1 15 
 
 
Government) as -1. Similarly, Elite Cues (Policy Change) is coded as 1 while No Elite 
Cues as 0, and Elite Cues (Status Quo) as -1. 
Participants were recruited from a demographically representative online panel 
pool maintained by the survey firm Qualtrics, which draws a panel using the stratified 
quota sampling method.34 Five hundred and fifty two adult Americans participated in an 
online experiment in their own settings in late March 2015. In exchange for their 
participation, the panelists received cash value rewards credited to their online accounts. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 87, with a mean age of 45.82. Of this sample, 52% 
were women, and their party affiliation was 34% Republican, and 48% Democrat 
(including partisan leaners). The summary statistics are provided in Table 3.1. These 
demographic characteristics largely resemble those of the most recent 2010 U.S. census 
data and the 2012 American National Election Study (ANES).  My data therefore have the 
benefits of both high internal validity (arising from random assignment in the experiment) 
                                                            
34 In particular, my sample is constructed so that it is representative of the most recent 2010 U.S. 
census data in terms of several key demographic variables, including age and gender. 
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as well as high external validity (to better reflect the population as a whole, unlike most 
convenience samples).35 
 
3.5 Experimental Results 
3.5.1 Cues and Policy Perceptions 
Figure 3.2 depicts public perceptions of policy change by institutional cues and elite cues. 
As expected, both institutional cues and elite cues influence public perceptions of policy 
change. Subjects are likely to perceive higher levels of policy change when the institutional 
cue of unified government is given, and lower levels of policy change when the institutional 
cue of divided government is presented. Similar patterns emerge for elite cues: the elite cue 
of policy change leads subjects to perceive higher levels of policy change while that of the 
status quo does the opposite. Figure 3.2b, which reports the results based on only partisans, 
largely mirrors the results for all the subjects, shown in Figure 3.2a. Although partisans’ 
perceptions of policy change in the Institutional Cue (Unified Government) × Elite Cue 
(Status Quo) condition appear to be inconsistent, this does not allow us to reject the 
hypothesis that the institutional cue of unified government leads to higher levels of policy 
perceptions.  
The OLS estimates reported in Table 3.2, and Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 help further 
evaluate the statistical significance of the effect of each cue and examine the interactional 
effect of two cues. Overall, these results support my hypotheses about the effects of 
                                                            
35  Since my analysis focuses on experiments with random assignment, the question of the 
representativeness of the sample is, however, less critical when estimating treatment effects.  
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Figure 3.2 Perception of Policy Change by Institutional Cues and Elite Cues 
 
(a) All Participants 
 
  
(b) Partisans 
 
  
 
institutional cues and elite cues separately, and suggest how the two distinct types of cues, 
together, affect policy perception.  
 There are several important findings that merit attention. First, elite cues have 
stronger influences on policy perception compared to institutional cues. As displayed in 
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Table 3.2 OLS Estimates of the Effects of Cues on Policy Perception 
 
  All Partisans  
  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Institutional 
Cues 0.091 0.048 ** 0.101 0.049 *** 
Elite Cues 0.266 0.058 *** 0.368 0.064 *** 
Institutional 
Cues × Elite 
Cues 
0.063 0.072 0.154 0.077 *** 
Constant 1.683 0.043 *** 1.706 0.045 *** 
Observations 552 494 
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 (one-tailed test) 
Dependent variables: Perception of Policy Change (ranging from 0 to 4) 
Independent variables: Institutional Cues (ranging from -1, divided government, 0, no 
institutional cues, to 1, unified government); Elite Cues (ranging from -1, status quo, 0, no elite 
cues, to 1, policy change) 
 
 
Figure 3.4, regardless of the sample, the presence of institutional cues, and their contents, 
the results provide consistent evidence to support my third hypothesis. Second, it is, 
however, important to note that subjects do not ignore institutional cues even when elites 
cures play a more effective role. As long as elite cues do provide conflicting information, 
the effects of institutional cues remain significant, albeit relative small, as shown in Figure 
3.3. Moreover, the effects of elite cues significantly increase when institutional cues are 
consistent. This is particularly the case among partisans. While this finding does not 
approach statistical significance among the sample of all subjects (p = 0.191), the direction 
of association is consistent with the theoretical expectation.  
Another interesting finding is that the influence of elite cues remains significant even if 
relatively objective institutional cues provide conflicting messages, as shown Figure 3.4. 
To be precise, for example, perception of policy gridlock based on the cue of divided 
government may not always guarantee the correct predictions. As the literature on 
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Figure 3.3 Marginal Effect of Institutional Cues on Policy Perception 
 
(a) All Participants 
  
(b) Partisans 
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Figure 3.4 Marginal Effect of Elite Cues on Policy Perception 
 
(a) All Participants 
  
 
 (b) Partisans 
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divided government shows, even under divided government, policy changes may be 
possible, if the ideological distance between the executive and the legislature is small, and 
the status quo is far away from all veto players (Tsebelis 2002), or if pivotal voters 
constitute a small gridlock interval (Krehbiel 1998). However, given that the cue of divided 
government usually reflects the possibility of policy gridlock well, the results suggest that 
inaccurate elite opinions can still misinform people, despite the presence of accurate 
institutional cues. In fact, Kuklinski et al. (2000) differentiate “being misinformed” from 
“being uninformed” (see also Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Nadeau 
and Niemi 1995; Rahn 1993). According to them, using rules of thumb to draw inferences 
on the basis of limited information does not produce rational opinion if the information is 
wrong. After all, elite cues with pervasive effects that can overwhelm institutional cues can 
work as a double-edged sword.  
Another interesting finding is that the influence of elite cues remains significant 
even if relatively objective institutional cues provide conflicting messages, as shown 
Figure 3.4. To be precise, for example, perception of policy gridlock based on the cue of 
divided government may not always guarantee the correct predictions. As the literature on 
divided government shows, even under divided government, policy changes may be 
possible, if the ideological distance between the executive and the legislature is small, and 
the status quo is far away from all veto players (Tsebelis 2002), or if pivotal voters 
constitute a small gridlock interval (Krehbiel 1998). However, given that the cue of divided 
government usually reflects the possibility of policy gridlock well, the results suggest that 
inaccurate elite opinions can still misinform people, despite the presence of accurate 
institutional cues. In fact, Kuklinski et al. (2000) differentiate “being misinformed” from 
81 
“being uninformed” (see also Kuklinski and Hurley 1994; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Nadeau 
and Niemi 1995; Rahn 1993). According to them, using rules of thumb to draw inferences 
on the basis of limited information does not produce rational opinion if the information is 
wrong. After all, elite cues with pervasive effects that can overwhelm institutional cues can 
work as a double-edged sword.  
 
 
3.5.2 Policy Perceptions and Partisan Beliefs 
Under my experimental design, subjects are only encouraged to perceive (rather than 
assigned to) certain levels of policy change by randomly assigning cues. Some subjects 
refuse or fail to perceive the assigned levels of policy change (or gridlock), but the object 
of inference here is the effect of the perception of policy change and not the randomly 
assigned cues themselves (for the effects of cues, see the supplementary analysis results 
presented later). The instrumental variables (IV) method provides an estimate of this effect 
as opposed to that of the encouragement. The IV estimand is the average effect among 
those induced to perceive a certain level of policy change by a randomized encouragement 
known as the complier average causal effect or the local average treatment effect (LATE) 
(for a full account of the assumptions needed to identify estimates as causal in the 
instrumental variables approach, see Sovey and Green 2011, Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 
1996). 
 Table 3.3 presents the two-stage least squares regression results that report the 
effect of policy perception on partisan beliefs. Using a Partisan Beliefs index that 
incorporates both a subject’s in-group favoritism, and opposition to compromise, I find 
evidence to support my fifth hypothesis that citizens are more likely to form their partisan 
beliefs as they expect a larger extent of policy change. This finding also holds when I 
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Table 3.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Policy Perception on 
Partisan Beliefs 
 
  Partisan Beliefs 
  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   
Policy Perception 0.283 0.114 *** 0.291 0.134 *** 
Age    -0.001 0.002  
Education    -0.013 0.042  
Woman    0.151 0.074 ** 
Income    0.002 0.011  
Black    0.202 0.122 * 
Constant -0.500 0.199 *** -0.536 0.363 * 
Observations 452 420 
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 (one-tailed test, for hypothesized relationship; two-tailed 
test, for control variables about which we have no hypothesis) 
Dependent variables: Partisan Beliefs which the mean of standard scores of In-Group 
Favoritism and Opposition to Compromise (ranging from -2.4 to 1.6) 
Key independent variable: Policy Perception (ranging from 0, no change at all, to 4, 
complete policy change) 
 
control for other demographic variables (As a comparison, refer to Appendix 2A.2 for the 
OLS estimates of two cues on partisan beliefs36).  
As shown in Table 3.4, the results from analysis of the disaggregated indicators 
also largely provide consistent evidence. In particular, the effect of policy perception on 
opposition to compromise is substantively large and statistically significant. Although the 
effect of policy perception on in-group favoritism does not reach the conventional 
statistical significance, the direction of association remains the same across alternative 
model specifications. This finding suggests that partisan beliefs have contextual 
underpinnings that have been largely ignored. Institutional cues and elite cues vary with 
                                                            
36 Table shows the OLS estimates of effects of cues on subjects’ partisan beliefs. Different from 
the previous results, these estimates demonstrate how institutional cues and elite cues are associated 
with measures of partisan beliefs. The statistical significance of the interaction term disappears 
while the effects of institutional cues and elites cues on a composite index of partisan beliefs remain 
statistically significant, albeit substantively small. 
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Table 3.4 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Effect of Policy Perception on 
Partisan Beliefs 
 
  In-Group Favoritism
Opposition to 
Compromise 
In-Group  
Favoritism 
Opposition to 
Compromise 
  Coeff SE  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
Policy 
Perception 3.568 3.552 0.664 0.260 *** 1.941 4.158  0.808 0.304 *** 
Age       0.120 0.072 ** -0.010 0.005 *** 
Education       -1.413 1.304  0.061 0.090
Woman       1.462 2.301  0.378 0.160 ** 
Income       -0.023 0.342  0.009 0.024
Black       10.639 3.778 *** 0.035 0.269
Constant 66.938 6.168 *** 1.336 0.455 *** 67.330 11.261 *** 1.107 0.783 * 
Observations 452 494 420 459 
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 (one-tailed test, for hypothesized relationship; two-tailed test, for control variables 
about which we have no hypothesis) 
Dependent variables: In-Group Favoritism (ranging from 0 to 100); Opposition to Compromise (ranging from 0 
to 6) 
Key independent variable: Policy Perception (ranging from 0, no change at all, to 4, complete policy change) 
 
 
the given institutional context, and to the extent that people perceive greater policy change 
from these available cues, they are more likely to become partisan.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
While an increasing literature documents theoretical and empirical grounds to suggest 
systematic relationships between political institutions and citizens’ beliefs and actions, 
scholars rarely verify the underlying premise that citizens can understand and infer relevant 
implications from institutional context. In particular, can citizens perceive the expected 
policy change from the given institutional context, as political scientists do?  
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To answer these questions, I conducted a survey experiment over a large sample of 
U.S. adults that allows direct evaluation of the relative impact of two cues, their interactive 
effect on policy perception, and subsequent consequences for partisan beliefs.  
My findings show that citizens shape their policy perceptions from the given 
institutional context by utilizing both easily observable institutional attributes and political 
elites’ opinion as heuristic tools. While easily accessible and direct elite opinions play a 
significant role in shaping citizens’ policy perceptions, I also find that institutional cues, 
relatively indirect cues that require moderate informational processing, show consistent 
effects. In particular, elite cues exercise influence largely unconditionally, regardless of the 
presence and the content of institutional cues. Institutional cues, however, are effective to 
the extent that elite cues do not present conflicting messages. Lastly, I find that public 
perceptions of policy change intensify partisan beliefs.  
There are several important implications and considerations to take into account. 
First, my results find not only citizens’ potential to make up their lack of information but 
also conditions under which to generate misinformation. Because heuristics are a substitute 
for actual knowledge, heuristic users are susceptible to a variety of biases that come with 
using a fast and efficient approach to decision making. Heuristics are useful when correct, 
but they can also prove detrimental when they are inaccurate (Dancey and Sheagley 2013; 
Kuklinski and Quirk 2000; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Mondak 1994). My results show elite 
opinions endorsing significant policy changes influence subjects’ policy perceptions 
despite the relatively objective institutional cue of divided government, exerting 
unconditional effects. On the other hand, the effects of institutional cues disappear when 
elite opinions point in the other direction. Considering the nature of the inferences citizens 
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make in this study, the possibility that trusted political elites present interpretations entirely 
opposite to the given institutional cues is less likely, in particular in American politics 
where multiple news media compete and citizens have a general ability to distinguish 
between partisan and non-partisan messages or credible and non-credible ones. However, 
my findings lead us to re-exam conditions under which accurate inferences are made. For 
example, inference about expected policy change, which is mostly non-partisan, contrasts 
the case where people already have their own partisan or directional goals regarding the 
object they evaluate and partisan elites disseminate diverging messages. Future research 
should specify conditions under which misinformation, or biased processing prevails 
accurate inference.   
Second, the results should be understood with a careful attention to the specific 
institutional context. In the American context, citizens are likely to use simple institutional 
characteristics such as divided government for heuristic reasoning about expected policy 
change. But such cues may not be always available in the other countries. In this light, 
several recent findings that European citizens have and effectively utilize alternative 
institutional cues merit attention. According to this literature, European citizens use 
historical regularities in cabinet participation to anticipate how the government will form 
after elections (Armstrong and Duch 2010). Also another study (Fortunato and Stevenson 
2013) finds that use coalition partnership as a heuristic to infer the direction of policy 
change in the absence of detailed information about parties’ legislative records. Further 
research would benefit greatly from experimental designs that can verify causal 
relationships in the given institutional context. 
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Lastly, previous studies that focus on the policy implications of institutional context 
largely remain in the literature on voting behavior (Anderson 2000; Downs 1995; Fiorina 
1992; Lacy and Paolino 1998; Kedar 2005; Powell and Whitten 1993; Rudolph 2003). 
However, my findings, that citizens’ policy perceptions influence their partisan beliefs, 
suggest the value of expanding the scope of research into broader areas of mass behavior. 
Accordingly, this study may contribute to overcoming the “drunkard’s search” of an 
increasing literature that connects political institutions and political behavior. That is, 
existing literature has heavily relied on the concept of “clarity of responsibility” (Anderson 
1995; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Huber et al. 2005; Norpoth 2001; Powell and Whitten 
1993; Rudolph 2003). Scholars have actively utilized this notion to study voting behavior, 
and in particular, economic voting, among other topics, and this institutional property that 
assigns credit and blame has been the major focus of the studies in the field of comparative 
political behavior. However, clarity of responsibility probably should not be the only 
property that political institutions have in influencing citizens’ political behavior. 
Unfortunately, there have been few studies that further explore alternative dimensions of 
institutional configurations that matter to understand various citizens’ beliefs and actions. 
My findings suggest that citizens’ perception of expected policy change that they derive 
from the given institutional context matters, suggesting micro-level foundations to link 
macro-level institutional arrangements and partisan behavior, one of the most studied 
forms of political behavior. 
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Appendix 3A.1 Survey Items and Stimuli 
 
[Introductory Text] 
 
We would like to know your thoughts about an upcoming election. Please read the brief 
description that follows, and then, we will ask you several questions about what you read.  
The 2016 United States elections will be held on Tuesday, November 8, 2016. At that time, 
the President of the United States will be elected. In addition, all 435 seats in the United 
States House of Representatives and 34 of the 100 seats in the United States Senate will be 
contested.    
 
Although both Republicans and Democrats agree that there must be significant changes in 
key issues, ranging from health care to immigration to gun control, they hold very different 
views and the opposite solutions to those issues. For example, Republicans would repeal 
the current health care reform, and push forward with an alternative plan known as the 
private coverage option. Democrats would expand the coverage for the uninsured further, 
and extends Medicaid as well. The below table shows a summary of where the Democratic 
Party and the Republican Party stand regarding several key policy areas.          
 
[1. Institutional Cue (Divided Government) × No Elite Cue] 
 
Suppose that we have a President from one political party and Congress controlled by 
another (For example, a President from the Republican Party while Congress controlled by 
the Democratic Party, or a President from the Democratic Party while Congress controlled 
by the Republican Party), as a result of the 2016 election.   
 
[2. Institutional Cue (Unified Government) × No Elite Cue] 
 
Suppose that we have a President who comes from the same political party that controls 
Congress (For example, a President from the Republican Party also controls Congress, or 
a President from the Democratic Party also controls Congress), as a result of the 2016 
election.    
 
[3. Institutional Cue (Divided Government) × Elite Cue (Policy Change)] 
 
Suppose that we have a President from one political party and Congress controlled by 
another (For example, a President from the Republican Party while Congress controlled by 
the Democratic Party, or a President from the Democratic Party while Congress controlled 
by the Republican Party), as a result of the 2016 election.   
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Leading Republicans and Democrats have acknowledged that even if their party wins 
control, it would remain very difficult to make substantial changes on major issues that 
have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 election, there 
will be few, if any, significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, health 
care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, no matter who wins 
the White House and Congress.   
 
[4. Institutional Cue (Divided Government) × Elite Cue (Status Quo) 
 
Suppose that we have a President who comes from the same political party that controls 
Congress (For example, a President from the Republican Party also controls Congress, or 
a President from the Democratic Party also controls Congress), as a result of the 2016 
election.   
 
Leading Republicans and Democrats have clear that if their party wins control, in the 
direction of their party's policy platform, they will make substantial changes on major 
issues that have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 
election, there will be significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, 
health care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, in the 
direction of political party in power.  
 
[5. Institutional Cue (Divided Government) × Elite Cue (Policy Change)] 
 
Suppose that we have a President from one political party and Congress controlled by 
another (For example, a President from the Republican Party while Congress controlled by 
the Democratic Party, or a President from the Democratic Party while Congress controlled 
by the Republican Party), as a result of the 2016 election.   
 
Leading Republicans and Democrats have clear that if their party wins control, in the 
direction of their party's policy platform, they will make substantial changes on major 
issues that have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 
election, there will be significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, 
health care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, in the 
direction of political party in power.   
 
[6. Institutional Cue (Unified Government) × Elite Cue (Status Quo)] 
 
Suppose that we have a President who comes from the same political party that controls 
Congress (For example, a President from the Republican Party also controls Congress, or 
a President from the Democratic Party also controls Congress), as a result of the 2016 
election.   
 
Leading Republicans and Democrats have acknowledged that even if their party wins 
control, it would remain very difficult to make substantial changes on major issues that 
have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 election, there 
will be few, if any, significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, health 
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care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, no matter who wins 
the White House and Congress. 
 
[7. No Institutional Cue × Elite Cue (Policy Change)] 
 
Leading Republicans and Democrats have acknowledged that even if their party wins 
control, it would remain very difficult to make substantial changes on major issues that 
have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 election, there 
will be few, if any, significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, health 
care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, no matter who wins 
the White House and Congress. 
 
[8. No Institutional Cue × Elite Cue (Status Quo)] 
 
Leading Republicans and Democrats have clear that if their party wins control, in the 
direction of their party's policy platform, they will make substantial changes on major 
issues that have been stalled in recent years. Experts predict that, as a result of the 2016 
election, there will be significant changes in key policies, including the budget deficit, 
health care, immigration, same-sex marriage, gun control, and anti-terrorism, in the 
direction of political party in power.                    
 
[Perception of Policy Change] 
 
Given this information, how much do you think the key policies can change, after the 2016 
election? 
 1. Not at all  
 2. A little  
 3. A moderate amount  
 4. A lot  
 5. Completely  
(Recoded from 0 to 4) 
 
[Feeling Towards Parties] 
 
We’d like you to rate how you feel towards the two major political parties on a scale of 0 
to 100. Zero means very unfavorable and 100 means very favorable. Fifty means you do 
not feel favorable or unfavorable. How would you rate your feeling toward the two political 
parties?  
______ Democratic Party  
______ Republican Party  
 
[Opposition to Compromise] 
 
Next, we have a question about the best approach for political leaders to follow in 
Washington. Where would you rate yourself on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 means it is more 
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important for political leaders to compromise in order to get things done, and 7 means it is 
more important for political leaders to stick to their beliefs even if little gets done?  
 1. More important to compromise 
 2. 
 3. 
 4.  
 5.  
 6.  
 7. More important to stick to beliefs  
(Recoded from 0 to 6)
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Appendix 3A.2 OLS Estimates of the Effect of Cues on Partisan Beliefs 
 
 
  Partisan Beliefs In-Group Favoritism 
Opposition to 
Compromise 
  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
Institutional 
Cues 0.041 1.450 * 1.250 1.130  0.086 0.720  
Elite Cues 0.051 1.800 ** 1.544 0.070  0.112 2.750 *** 
Institutional 
Cues × Elite 
Cues 0.063 0.020
1.893 0.100  0.137 -0.080  
Age 0.002 -0.720 0.072 1.570 * 0.005 -2.49 * 
Education 0.041 -1.070 1.229 -1.230  0.085 -0.22  
Woman 0.075 1.450 2.274 0.490  0.157 1.88 ** 
Income 0.011 -0.190 0.348 -0.190  0.025 0.06  
Black 0.127 1.830 ** 3.860 2.870 *** 0.270 0.44 ** 
Constant 0.180 0.750 5.461 13.110 *** 0.368 7.91 *** 
Observations 420 420 459 
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10 (one-tailed test, for hypothesized relationship; two-tailed test, for 
control variables about which we have no hypothesis)
Dependent variables: Partisan Beliefs which the mean of standard scores of In-Group 
Favoritism and Opposition to Compromise (ranging from -2.4 to 1.6); In-Group Favoritism 
(ranging from 0 to 100); Opposition to Compromise (ranging from 0 to 6) 
Key independent variable: Policy Perception (ranging from 0, no change at all, to 4, 
complete policy change) 
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Chapter IV 
 
The Partisan Secret:  
Institutional Constraints on Policy Change and Party Unity 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter argues that institutional context shapes the partisan bond among legislators. 
Viewing party unity as a broad concept that encompasses party members’ decisions to vote 
together and their decisions to belong together, I theorize that institutional constraints on 
policy change significantly reduce political parties’ abilities and incentives to foster party 
unity. Drawing upon novel measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, I 
find evidence to support this relationship, based on 129 countries, with time series 
extending from 1980 to 2000. My account explains both temporal and spatial variation in 
legislators’ partisan behavior across diverse countries in a consistent way regardless of 
their institutional difference, providing the broadest empirical examination yet conducted 
on this question. 
 
 
 
98 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Political parties play a central role in modern democracies. Parties aggregate diverse social 
interests and structure an array of political choices for voters; they recruit candidates and 
compete for public offices; and finally, parties form the government and organize policy 
making (Key 1964). As a main vehicle that bridges voters and the government, “modern 
democracy is unthinkable” without political parties (Schattschneider 1942, 1).   
According to contemporary scholarship, a political party forms as a solution to 
internal and external problems of collective action inherent in the legislative process 
(Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2005). Without durable coalitions, legislators 
face chaotic and unpredictable outcomes in policy making. Also, a political party enables 
party members to achieve (re)election by providing a brand name (or reputation) and 
resources for mobilizing citizens. Providing collective benefits, political parties are 
inevitable for legislators who face tough choices among votes, seats, and policies (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005; Fenno 1973; Saalfeld and Strøm 2014, 372; Strøm 1990).  
As Schumpeter (1942, 283) put it, “[a] party is a group whose members propose to 
act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power.” Majority status confers 
substantial political benefits including internal advancement in the legislature and policy 
goals. Thus, to win majority status, legislators seek to solve the cooperation and 
coordination problems they face, and thus to enhance their legislative accomplishments 
and collective reputations by delegating to party leaders the authority to manage legislative 
resources and the legislative process.  
Thus, the extent to which parties can discipline their members, ensuring a cohesive 
voting on the floor, has been a central concern in the literature on legislative behavior and 
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political parties, and a growing number of scholars seek to understand variation in party 
unity in a comparative perspective. This article contributes to this literature by placing 
political parties in a broad institutional environment. In particular, focusing on the 
institutional setting for policy making, I contend that institutional constraints on policy 
change significantly reduce political parties’ abilities and incentives to foster party unity. 
While many scholars have focused on institutional factors in explaining the patterns 
of party unity, the existing literature suffers from several shortcomings. First, while the 
existing literature examines the impacts of different institutional factors, the specific 
mechanism that links party unity and institutional environment often remains theoretically 
vague. For example, presidential systems are often argued to weaken legislative party unity 
whereas parliamentary systems are generally associated with higher levels of party unity 
(Baron 1998; Carey 2007; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005; 
Huber 1996); federalism is argued to weaken legislative party unity at the national level 
(Mainwaring 1999); where electoral systems foster competition among legislative 
candidates within the same party for personal votes (compared to closed lists electoral 
rules), parties should be less unified (Carey and Shugart 1995; Golden and Chang 2001; 
Hix 2004). However, how and why are these factors related to our contemporary 
understanding of how parties form and work? How do institutional factors systematically 
change key aspect(s) of the ways in which political parties foster unity?  
Second, and as a result, most of the institutional accounts investigate the effects of 
individual institutional factors but do not offer a theoretical framework to understand the 
relationships among those factors in explaining party unity. For example, scholars compare 
the influences of different regime types, electoral systems, and party systems. However, 
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what are the relationships among those institutional factors? More importantly, how can 
we compare different cases across the multiple dimensions of institutional arrangements, 
and ultimately understand their roles in a consistent framework? Putting all individual 
institutions into a statistical model not only lacks a strong theoretical basis, but also fails 
to analytically explore how different configurations of political institutions matter. 
The third issue is conceptual. While the concept of party unity itself refers to the 
observable degree to which party members belong and act together in general,37 most of 
literature on party unity has focused heavily on party unity in legislative voting. Admittedly, 
in all democracies, legislatures are where major public policies are made, and legislators’ 
voting behavior is of intrinsic interest to both scholars and general public. However, party 
unity also serves as an information shortcut to citizens to evaluate not only where the 
parties stand but also what they can do (Carey 2007, 93). Moreover, it is often argued to 
signal the level of party system institutionalization, and the consolidation of democracy. 
While voting unity is clearly a central element that characterizes the extent of party unity, 
it cannot be the whole story. This issue becomes more critical when one considers the 
controversies surrounding the commonly used measure: unity in roll-call votes (see, for 
example, Rice 1925; Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Carey 2007; 2009). As Keith Krehbiel 
(2000) points out, it is impossible from roll-call data to tell whether party unity in the 
legislature is due to party discipline or to ideological homogeneity. Moreover, these 
recorded votes are not a random selection of votes (Carrubba et al. 2006; Clinton and 
                                                            
37 It is useful to clarify some terminological issues, as the terms ‘unity’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘discipline’ 
are often used interchangeably. Nonetheless, it is useful to keep them apart as referring to different 
analytical concepts, despite the difficulties of isolating the concepts in empirical research. Refer to 
the later discussion of different sources of party unity. 
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Lapinski 2008); rather, they are often called for by party leaders to signal the position of 
the group to outside groups, or to induce unity (Carrubba, Gabel, Hug 2008). These 
strategic incentives suggest that groups are likely to be more cohesive in roll-call votes 
than in non-roll-call votes (see Hug 2010). Given that most scholars care about party unity 
in the context of its independent role in politics, we need to do more than show voting unity 
for a complete picture. In discussing how parties stick together, Cox and McCubbins (2005, 
10; 31-32) consider not only how parties discipline members to foster legislative cohesion 
but also what factors discourage members from quitting the party. To fully understand 
legislators’ partisan bonds or ‘loyalty’, we may also need to consider both ‘voice’ and ‘exit’ 
(Hirschman 1970). Given that disunity, or dissent, occurs when party members voice and 
act against their party, party switching can be viewed as an extreme manifestation of 
partisan dissent (Kato 1998; O’Brien and Shomer 2013). While there are some studies that 
focus on legislators’ party switching (see for example, Aldrich and Bianco 1992; Desposato 
2006; Grose 2004; Heller and Mershon 2005; 2008, 2009; Laver and Benoit 2003; Mershon 
and Shvetsova 2008; O’Brien and Shomer 2013), a theoretical attempt to understand these 
related behaviors in a consistent framework is underdeveloped (see Kato 1998 for an 
exception). 
Lastly, the lack of a broad cross-national dataset with sufficient temporal or spatial 
coverage has made it difficult for empirical analysis to reach a definitive conclusion 
regarding institutional effects. Due to this difficulty, most cross-national studies limit their 
focus to a small number of cases with either all presidential (Morgenstern 2004) or 
parliamentary systems (Depauw and Martin 2009; Kam 2009; Sieberer 2006), which 
restricts the ability to test for the effects of institutional factors on party unity. In particular, 
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as most of traditional institutional variables do not vary over time, scholars usually rely on 
spatial variation, with the remaining issue of how to control unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries. While Carey’s (2007) cross-national study provides the most 
comprehensive empirical test of institutional accounts along these lines, his empirical 
evidence does not fully address this concern, as Cheibub (2007, 133-134) correctly notes.38  
In this article, I posit that it is the institutional structures for policy making – in 
particular, institutional constraints on policy change – that shape the unity of political 
parties. In particular, I demonstrate how the configurations of veto players determine the 
power of agenda control, a key element of party discipline, and the value of the party’s 
majority status, and this in turn affects the unity of the party. I draw on Tsebelis’ veto 
players model, which places different institutional configurations in a continuum, and 
contend that institutional configurations that allow for a large degree of policy change 
facilitate party unity. I also focus on how institutional context interacts with candidate 
selection method, a key disciplinary tool party leaders can use to affect the party unity. 
Accordingly, I offer an alternative account of why countries with different 
characteristics in terms of traditional variables (regimes, party systems, electoral systems, 
types of legislatures, among others) often show similar patterns of party unity. This 
framework also enables us to systematically analyze both spatial and temporal variation in 
party unity. To test my hypotheses, I construct a novel measure of party unity from the 
                                                            
38 Indeed, while his analysis includes 19 countries, almost all presidential countries (except the 
United States) are relatively new democracies where political parties are not fully institutionalized; 
but most of parliamentary regimes are countries with relatively longer democratic experience. 
Presidential regimes in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, United States, and Uruguay, while parliamentary 
regimes include Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Israel, and New Zealand. 
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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge et al. 2015). Based on coding by 
thousands of country experts and covering 129 democracies over several decades, V-Dem 
provides alternative indicators of party unity (both legislative cohesion and party 
switching), which I employ to conduct multiple tests to probe the relationship between 
institutional conditions and party unity. 
This article proceeds as follows. I first review the existing literature on party unity, 
and connect the contemporary understanding of political parties to the analytical 
framework of political institutions. From this integrative understanding, I demonstrate how 
institutional structure for policy making affects both party leaders’ ability and incentives 
to foster party unity, and derive main hypotheses on party unity that encompasses 
legislators’ voting unity and party switching. Then, I present the data, my measures of the 
main variables, and the method used to test the hypotheses, followed by the quantitative 
analysis results. The article concludes by discussing the implications for partisan politics 
and future research. 
 
4.2 Political Institutions, Policy Change, and Party Unity 
Party unity results from three distinct sources (Carey 2007, 93; Heller and Mershon 2008, 
911): cohesion, discipline, and agenda control. To begin with, party unity can be obtained 
by shared preference, which I refer to party cohesion. Elections produce legislative parties 
of like-minded legislators (e.g. Krehbiel 1993). However, members of a party disagree 
from time to time, and even when party cohesion fails, unity still can be brought about 
through party discipline. Party leaders control resources both within their parties and in the 
legislature (e.g. the authority to assign members key positions within the party, to appoint 
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members to important committee positions, and to nominate candidates for election), and 
use these resources as sanctions or rewards to induce members act together for a common 
purpose. Lastly, party leaders can uphold party unity by controlling the legislative agenda, 
the set of bills considered and voted on the floor. Cox and McCubbins distinguish between 
“positive” and “negative” agenda power. While the former refers to “the ability to push 
bills through the legislative process to a final-passage vote on the floor,” the latter captures 
“the ability to block bills from reaching a final passage vote on the floor” (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005: 20). In particular, Cox and McCubbins suggests that party leaders use 
their agenda-setting power to manage conflicts between collective and individual goals: 
controlling the agenda so that the sharpest conflicts are never even considered on the floor.  
As Cox and McCubbins (2005, 32-33) point out, agenda control (in particular, 
negative agenda-setting power) is the most effective and least costly mechanism to bring 
about party unity. Screening candidates and disciplining legislators are costly and time-
consuming actions. As in the case of the United States, party leaders’ nominating power, 
which is one of the central disciplinary tools, is not always available. On the other hand, 
controlling the agenda also indirectly results in party unity by contributing to other sources 
of party unity such as cohesion and party discipline. The better the majority party’s control 
of agenda-setting powers is, the more able it will be to secure favorable legislative 
accomplishments and the better its reputation or brand name will be. The better the party’s 
brand name, the better will be the prospects for (re)attainment of majority status (Cox and 
McCubbins 2005, 7). The majority status provides party leaders more resources (e.g. 
advancement to key positions in the legislature) to screen (to foster cohesiveness) and 
discipline party members.  
105 
 
In a nutshell, to the extent that party leaders are able to use agenda-setting powers 
effectively, parties can achieve unity. However, the power to control legislative agenda is 
closely tied with a broad institutional context and, in particular, institutional arrangements 
that structure policy-making process. No one makes this point clearer than George Tsebelis 
(2002). Agenda setters have to make proposals acceptable to the other veto players. 
Otherwise the proposals will be rejected and the status quo will be preserved. They will 
select among the feasible outcomes the one they prefer most. As a consequence, agenda 
setting powers are inversely associated with policy stability: the higher policy stability (the 
smaller the set of outcomes that can replace the status quo), the smaller the role of agenda 
setting. At the limit case where change from the status quo is impossible, it does not make 
any difference who controls the agenda. Recent studies have indirectly corroborated this 
theoretical expectation. For example, Bräuninger and König (1999) find that the agenda 
setting powers of the German government declines when legislation has to be approved by 
the upper chamber, the Bundesrat (See Sieberer 2006 for a similar argument). In an 
empirical study of East Central Europe, Zubek (2011) finds that countries with more 
centralized party systems have more opportunities for negative agenda control. In a similar 
vein, Zucchini (2011; 2011a) also links the party systems that prevent large policy change 
and limited agenda setting powers in some parliamentary systems. 
Institutional constraints on policy change not only influence party leaders’ ability 
to discipline party members – in particular, through agenda control – but also affect the 
incentives for legislators to cooperate for partisan goals and for party leaders to discipline 
party members. The more difficult it is to change the status quo policy, the more 
constrained parties are in reaching outcomes as close as possible to their ideal points. 
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Accordingly, when institutional conditions do not allow significant policy changes, the 
incentives for partisan cooperation are likely to diminish, as is the value of majority status 
for parties, discouraging party unity. Conversely, partisan cooperation is more likely to 
matter for individual legislators in the institutional conditions where significant policy 
changes are possible. Another potential path is provided through the legislators’ electoral 
connection to voters. If institutional conditions do not permit significant policy changes, 
the party differentials between the parties (comparative benefits of supporting a political 
party over the other) are likely to decrease. As a result, a party’s label loses its informational 
value, and the political party in power is less likely to matter for voters, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 2. Then, the extent as voters do not care which party wins the election, legislators’ 
incentives for stronger party unity will be weaker. In contrast, with more partisan voters, 
legislators have stronger incentives to cooperate to secure and enhance the reputation of 
their party brands, and similarly they face greater transaction costs for switching their 
existing party membership. 
 This theoretical expectation regarding the connection between institutional 
conditions for policy making and political parties is not entirely new. In his analysis of 
nineteenth-century England, Cox (1987) attributes the development of partisan politics to 
the centralization of legislative authority in the Cabinet, which Walter Bagehot identified 
as the “efficient secret,” largely after the passage of the first Reform Act in 1832. In a 
similar vein, by analyzing the case of Brazil, Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) claim that the 
unexpected level of legislative vote cohesion (despite a presidential system with intraparty 
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electoral competition) should be attributed to various provisions centralizing control over 
the legislative agenda.39  
It is José Antonio Cheibub (Cheibub 2007; Cheibub and Limongi 2002) who most 
systematically reviews and criticizes the existing institutional accounts. While the common 
arguments connect the regime type to levels of party unity, Cheibub contends that such 
claims are not only based on the untenable assumption about politicians – that they are 
purely office seekers – but are also inconsistent.40 Reviewing the existing literature (Baron 
1998; Carey 2007; Diermerier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996), he contends that what 
matters for party discipline (or party cohesion) is the way policy making is organized, and 
that the regime type itself is not sufficient to differentiate for this critical dimension. 
According to him, underlying formal models that link a parliamentary system with higher 
voting unity is the view of a presidential system such as that in the United States, where 
agenda-setting power lies with the legislature. However, if a majority party can control the 
legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2005) in much the same way as prime minister 
                                                            
39 See also Mayhew (1974) and Thorson (1998) for a similar idea in the literature on American 
politics 
40 That is, a standard argument is that presidents have no means to induce legislators to cooperate 
for presidential initiatives and legislators have a clear preference for protecting their constituents’ 
interests to obtain their votes again in the future. On the other hand, the same would not occur under 
a parliamentary regime, as the prime ministers can offer their proposals as matters of confidence 
(Carey 2007, 94; see also Diermerier and Feddersen 1998; Huber 1996). However, Cheibub claims 
that the prime minister’s calling (or threatening to call) an early election (that might result from a 
vote of no confidence) is not a credible threat that would induce party unity (Cheibub 2007, 123). 
Legislators who contribute to the collapse of the government while protecting their constituents’ 
interests are not likely to be punished at the polls by those constituents. In order for such a threat 
to be credible, something beyond the vote of no confidence must also exist. While electoral laws 
may provide the incentives for legislators to cultivate personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995; Hix 
2004), the institutional setting for policy making, as Cheibub (2007, 122) notes, may deny them 
the means to do so (by centralizing decision making so that the preferences of the individual 
legislator are virtually irrelevant). 
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can, then the mechanism that drives party cohesion in parliamentary regimes can also 
operate under presidentialism (Cheibub 2007, 124). Although the two systems differ in the 
identity of the agenda setter – government in parliamentary systems, parliament in 
presidential ones; exactly the opposite from the expectations generated by the names, as 
Tsebelis (2002, 67) points out – we have no reason to expect a systematic variation in the 
centralization of policy making between a parliamentary system and a presidential system 
(Cheibub, Prezworski, and Saiegh 2004).41 
As discussed above, while several scholars emphasize the role of institutional 
arrangements that shape policy making, this insight has rarely been incorporated in a broad 
comparative analysis on party unity. An important challenge comes from the lack of 
theoretical framework that enables us to understand, compare, and analyze different sets of 
political institutions in a consistent way. Neither regime types, nor party systems alone 
capture the whole picture of institutional setting for policy making, and the understanding 
of how different combinations of traditional variables (such as regimes, party systems, 
electoral systems, and legislative structures, among others) structure the policy making is 
necessary for a systematic cross-national study. Moreover, while most traditional 
institutional variables vary only across countries, the wide cross-national variation in 
legislative rules and practices poses a serious obstacle to valid cross-national study of party 
unity (Cheibub 2007, 134; Kam 2009, 5).   
                                                            
41 Based on a broad cross-national study, Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh (2004) argue that 
presidents are on par with parliamentary executives in forming legislative coalitions to pass 
legislation. See also Laver and Shepsle (1999) for the argument that divided government, where 
the executive needs to seek support in the legislature beyond its own partisan base, per se does not 
distinguish parliamentary and presidential regimes. 
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I overcome these challenges by drawing on the analytical framework that focuses 
on institutional consequences for policy stability. While many scholars have studied the 
theoretical and empirical significance of political institutions in terms of their ability to 
change the policy of the status quo (Krehbiel 1998; Brady and Volden 1998; Binder 1999; 
Coleman 1999; Cox and McCubbins 2001; Chiou and Rothenberg 2003; see also Lijphart 
1984; 1999), it is Tsebelis’ veto players theory that develops a simple but rigorous 
framework to analyze the diverse institutional structures across countries and over time. 
Veto players are actors and institutions whose consent is required to alter policy. According 
to this framework, traditional variables, including regime types, the number of legislative 
chambers, the number or ideological positions of parties, or decision-making rules of all 
these actors, are translated into a certain configuration of veto players, which in turn will 
determine the policy stability in a political system. As the number of veto players, and the 
ideological distance among them, increases, the set of outcomes that can replace the status 
quo (or the winset of the status quo) decreases, and thus, significant departures from the 
status quo are impossible (Tsebelis 1995; 2002). Accordingly, the number of veto players 
may change over time in a country. For example, depending on whether the President and 
the two Houses of Congress are from the same party, or whether there exists significant 
ideological distance between the two major parties, the configuration of veto players in the 
United States can be very different. Such a theoretical implication is particularly significant 
for empirical analysis in the sense that this analytical framework enables us to analyze 
institutional effects using temporal variations within a country, overcoming the existing 
issue of how to control unobserved heterogeneity across countries.  
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In essence, institutional context significantly influences both party leaders’ ability 
to discipline party members and party members’ incentives to cooperate for their collective 
goals. In particular, institutional constraints on policy change will reduce the power of 
agenda control, which provides the most effective mechanism to bring about party unity. 
Moreover, when institutional context does not allow significant policy change, the party in 
power is less likely to matter (to both legislators and voters), and thus the incentives for 
party unity are likely to decrease.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Party unity should decrease as the institutional constraints on policy change 
increase. 
 
However, the existing literature documents somewhat conflicting evidence regarding 
whether party discipline and party unity, and in particular party sticking (vs. party 
switching), go hand in hand. For example, in their analysis of the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies from 1988 to 2000, Heller and Mershon (2008) offer a counterintuitive claim that 
strong party discipline creates an incentive for legislators, who have ambition of electoral 
success and career advancement, to switch their parties. I seek to resolve this puzzle by 
specifying conditions under which party leaders’ discipline may backfire, leading to party 
disunity and to party members choosing the exit option.  
In particular, I pay careful attention to the interactive relationship between 
disciplinary tools and the institutional context. Party leaders sometimes lack their powers 
over candidate selection (e.g. the United States or Iceland, where primaries are used), and 
the extent of their influence varies significantly across different political contexts. The 
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process by which candidates are selected constitutes a key element of parties’ disciplinary 
tools to bring about party unity. Accordingly, many scholars have focused on the role of 
candidate selection process in explaining party unity (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Pennings 
and Hazan 2001; Le Duc 2001).42 If candidates are selected exclusively by a small group 
of party leadership (rather than a ballot of all party members, or by regional party 
organization), the party can ensure the cohesion of a legislative body “by weeding out 
potential troublemakers” (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999, 6). In contrast, candidates 
selected by more decentralized procedures, such as primaries, are in a more independent 
position vis-à-vis the party and its leadership, incentivized to rely on their personal 
reputation and records, which in turn leads them to deviate more frequently from the 
demands of the party leadership (Hazan 1999; O’Brien and Shomer 2013; Pennings and 
Rahat 2001). I posit that institutional constraints on policy change interact with the 
candidate selection process to determine party unity. Party leaders’ control of candidate 
selection is likely to foster party unity, as originally intended, but its impact would decrease 
where institutional arrangements limit the extent of policy change (and thus, the powers of 
agenda control). Conversely, to the extent that institutional context allows greater policy 
change (and thus greater agenda control power), party leaders’ control of candidate 
selection is more likely to foster party unity.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  The positive impact of centralized candidate selection on party unity will 
decrease as institutional constraints on policy change increase. 
                                                            
42 Another advantage of focusing on the candidate selection process as a key variable that represents 
party discipline is that it is easily observable, and comparable within and across different contexts, 
compared to other disciplinary tools (e.g., advancement of key positions in the legislature). 
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This also implies the conditional effect of institutional constraints. That is, when party 
leaders exercise their power over candidate selection process, the institutional conditions 
that permit greater policy change (such as a small number of veto players) are more likely 
to produce higher levels of party unity. In contrast, such an institutional effect would 
decrease as the available tools party leaders can control to discipline party members, such 
as their nomination power, decrease. This suggests the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The negative impact of institutional constraints on party unity will decrease 
as candidate selection methods are decentralized. 
 
4.3 Data and Measures 
For an empirical test of these hypotheses, I combine several datasets that include measures 
of key variables. I first define party unity, the dependent variable in this study, as a broad 
concept that is not limited to voting unity in the legislature. While most scholars focus on 
voting unity as an ultimate test for the ability of legislative parties to act in unison, 
controversies surrounding the common measure (such as the Rice Index of Cohesion) 
discussed above demand alternative ways to test theories and different measures to 
overcome the existing issues inherent in using roll-call data. Party disunity, or dissent, 
occurs when a party member acts against his or her party (Ozbudun 1970, 305). Thus, it 
encompasses a variety of activities, ranging from a legislator speaking out publicly against 
the party43, to voting against the party line, and – at the limit – defection (Kam 2009, 39). 
                                                            
43 See Becher and Sieberer (2008), for a study that employs legislators’ public explanation of their 
voting decision as an indicator for party unity.  
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In discussing how parties stick together, Cox and McCubbins (2005, 10; 31-32) are very 
attentive, and consider not only how parties discipline party members to foster legislative 
cohesion but also what makes party members refrain from quitting the party. A more 
complete picture can emerge, when we understand partisan bonds, or loyalty in relation to 
voice and exit together. 
To this end, I construct a novel measure of party unity by incorporating two 
indicators, voting unity and party switching, from the Varieties of Democracy dataset. This 
new dataset includes data on multiple indicators of different features of political parties in 
173 countries around the world from 1900 until 2012, engaging over 2,500 country experts 
worldwide to collect the data (Coppedge et al. 2015). The country-expert data is combined 
into country-year estimates using a Bayesian ordinal item-response theory model. The first 
indicator is based on a question about the extent to which members of the legislature vote 
with other members of their party on important bills; the second indicator concerns the 
percentage of the members of the national legislature that changes or abandons their party 
in between elections. Indicators are aggregated through simple addition to form a Party 
Unity index, reflecting the expectation that each element of the index is partially 
substitutable.44 Further detail on these measures is contained in Appendix 3A. It bears 
emphasis that the empirical results shown in subsequent tables are largely robust to the 
disaggregation of these indicators. 
                                                            
44 An alternative aggregation rule, the multiplication of the two components requires the logic that 
every attribute is necessary for the concept and each of them affects the index only to the degree 
that the others are present. This view does not reflect the understanding of the relationship between 
voting unity and party switching.    
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The systematic relationships between institutional characteristics and party unity 
can be assessed only if there exists a meaningful competition among political parties. Thus, 
I exclude cases where executive and legislative positions are not filled by elections, using 
Vanhanen’s (2000) measure of democratic competition.45 Within this group, 129 countries, 
with time series from 1980 to 2000, are included in the main analysis given the availability 
of data. 
To measure the main independent variable, the institutional constraints on policy 
change, I employ the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) developed by Henisz (2002). 
The measure is especially useful for purposes of testing my theory because it is designed 
to quantify the “feasibility of a change in policy given the structure of a nation’s political 
institutions (the number of veto points) and the preferences of the actors that inhabit them 
(the partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the 
preferences within each branch)” (Henisz and Zelner 2010). Based on a spatial model of 
interaction between political actors, the measure takes into account three factors: 1) the 
number of independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, 2) 
the extent of party alignment across branches of government, and 3) the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch. The measure is continuous, with 
possible values ranging from 0 to 1. The largest values are given to country-years that 
feature the largest institutional constraints on policy change. Consistent with the theoretical 
insights supported by Tsebelis (1995, 2002), this measure pays particular attention to the 
institutional consequences for policy stability.  
                                                            
45 Vanhanen’s (2000) measure of democratic competition is constructed by 100  votes won by the 
largest party in presidential or parliamentary elections (or both, averaged) as % of total votes cast. 
If executive and legislative positions are not filled by elections, competitiveness is scored as zero. 
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On the other hand, the level of centralization of the candidate selection method is 
measured by the V-Dem dataset. I reversed the original scale for convenient interpretation 
of the analysis results. In this reversed scale, the more centralized the candidate selection 
method, the higher the values given. The largest value is assigned to cases where national 
legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders; the smallest value 
to the cases where candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.  
To isolate the effect of institutional constraints on party unity, I include several 
control variables. First, I control for the effect of economic context on partisan behavior in 
the legislature, by including GDP per capita, a variable that can capture the levels of 
economic development. Party unity may be associated with the variables that are often 
argued to contribute to the institutionalization of political parties. For example, conflicts 
and controversies arising out of social divisions provide the demand for distinctive 
representation and the driving force behind the development of political parties (e.g., Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). Also, political parties may not be considered as institutionalized if they 
cannot survive over time. Besides, the level of democracy may influence the partisan 
patterns in the legislature. To account for these possibilities, I control for the effect of the 
level of democracy46, party age, and ethnic fractionalization. Summary statistics and the 
number of observations available for each variable are displayed in Table 4.1 (see 
Appendix 4A for details of these measures). 
                                                            
46 Among several alternative options, Polity IV incorporate a component to capture the extent of 
checks and balances which captures an important dimension which the POLCON is based on; 
Freedom House employs a maximalist definition of democracy as it includes both political and 
civil rights along with other aspects of democracy. Compared to other measures, Vanhanen (2000) 
is composed of two elements: a measure of competition (the percent of seats in the legislature won 
by all but the plurality winner) and a measure of participation (the number of voters divided by the 
entire population), which are, according to him, “objective” indicators. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Variables 
 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
Voting Unity overall 0.241 0.861 -2.915 1.559 N = 2216 
 between  0.777 -2.789 1.463 n = 149 
 within  0.250 -1.460 1.487 T = 14.87 
Party Switching overall 0.195 1.050 -0.964 4.942 N = 2216 
 between  1.054 -0.964 4.942 n = 149 
 within  0.351 -2.991 2.346 T = 14.87 
POLCON overall 0.306 0.206 0.000 0.720 N = 2173 
 between  0.179 0.000 0.700 n = 148 
 within  0.117 -0.220 0.793 T = 14.68 
Candidate 
Selection overall -0.506 0.976 -3.337 1.705 N = 2216 
 between  0.900 -3.337 1.608 n = 149 
 within  0.274 -1.773 0.894 T = 14.87 
GDP per capita overall 6472.638 6133.059 436.110 28701.930 N = 1980 
 between  5505.235 449.152 22895.800 n = 136 
 within  1191.235 1660.750 15112.470 T = 14.56 
Democracy overall 17.391 12.594 0.000 47.080 N = 2217 
 between  11.501 0.060 42.692 n = 149 
 within  4.567 -11.968 35.094 T = 14.88 
Party Age overall 33.218 28.780 3.750 153.546 N = 2150 
 between  26.240 3.750 146.645 n = 143 
 within  2.084 11.962 47.529 T = 15.04 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization overall 0.417 0.258 0.000 0.930 N = 2114 
 between  0.261 0.000 0.930 n = 144 
  within   0.000 0.417 0.417 T = 14.68 
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Formally, the basic time-series cross-sectional specification is as follows: 
 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ 	βଵ	ܱܲܮܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ 	൅ βଶ	ܥܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁	݈ܵ݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧ 	൅ βଷ	ܱܲܮܥܱ ௜ܰ௧	
ൈ ܥܽ݊݀݅݀ܽݐ݁	݈ܵ݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜௧ 
						൅	ܺ′௜௧βସ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߛ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
 
Where ௜ܻ௧ is the Party Unity Index in country i and year t,  αi  and γt  are country-specific 
and year-specific intercepts, X’it is a vector of time-varying control variables, the remaining 
variables are the partisan-institutional indicators of interest introduced above, and ߳௜௧ is an 
idiosyncratic error. The country fixed effects capture time-invariant country-specific 
confounders. The year fixed effects capture factors that are common across all countries in 
a particular year, such as global socioeconomic factors and control for any general time 
trend in my data. I vary this basic model with alternative sets of control variables and 
different model specifications.  
 
4.4 Analysis Results 
I begin with the basic specification, presented in Model 1, Table 4.2. Here, party unity is 
regressed on POLCON in an ordinary least squares model along with year and country 
fixed effects, using cluster-robust errors to correct for panel-specific autocorrelation. This 
model covers 1,860 country-year observations from 129 countries from 1980 to 2000. 
Model 2 replaces the use of country fixed effect in a random effects model given the time-
invariant variable, ethnic fractionalization, and other variables that change little over time. 
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Table 4.2 Estimates for Party Unity 
 
  Party Unity 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient   Standard Error Coefficient   
Standard 
Error 
POLCON -0.303 ** 0.125 -0.301 * 0.124 
Candidate Selection 0.290 *** 0.078 0.269 *** 0.073 
GDP per capita 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 * 0.000 
Democracy -0.006  0.004 -0.004  0.004 
Party Age 0.012  0.008 0.011  0.003 
Ethnic Fractionalization    -0.519 * 0.300 
       
 Year FE   Year FE   
 Country FE   Country RE   
       
           
Countries 129     129     
Years (Max) 21   21   
Obs 1860  1860   
R2 (within) 0.244     0.271     
       
Outcome: party unity. Unit of analysis: country-year. FE: fixed effects. RE: random effects.  
Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), standard errors clustered by country.  
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10.      
 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for POLCON in Models 1 and 2 
indicate its significant relationship with party unity. The results suggest that institutional 
constraints on policy change discourage party unity, consistent with my theoretical 
expectation. I also find that centralized candidate selection methods are likely to foster 
party unity. Among the control variables, only Ethnic Fractionalization has a consistent 
negative effect on party unity. Model 1, Table 4.3 offers a refinement of Model 1, Table 
4.2 by considering that the effect of candidate selection method is conditioned by its 
institutional context. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the positive impact of centralized 
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Table 4.3 Estimates for Party Unity 
 
  Party Unity 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient   Standard Error Coefficient   
Standard 
Error 
POLCON -0.396 *** 0.155 -0.388 *** 0.153
Candidate Selection 0.407 *** 0.079 0.382 *** 0.077
POLCON*Candidate 
Selection -0.492 ** 0.162 -0.467 *** 0.161
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.000
Democracy -0.005 0.004 -0.004  0.003
Party Age 0.012 0.008 0.010 *** 0.003
Ethnic Fractionalization    -0.567  0.300
       
 Year FE   Year FE   
 Country FE   Country RE   
       
           
Countries 129     129     
Years (Max) 21  21   
Obs 1860  1860   
R2 (within) 0.272     0.271     
       
Outcome: party unity. Unit of analysis: country-year. FE: fixed effects. RE: random effects.  
Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), standard errors clustered by country.  
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10.      
 
 
candidate selection decreases as institutional constraints on policy change increase. Given 
that candidate selection process is a key disciplinary device that party leaders can use to 
control their members, this result shows how institutional constraints condition the way 
such control is exercised to foster party unity. For the convenience of the interpretation, I 
plot the estimated marginal effect of the centralized candidate selection and the 95% 
confidence intervals over the range of POLCON in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 
 
 
Overall, centralized candidate selection works as expected, fostering party unity. 
When institutional arrangements do not allow any significant change, however, such a 
disciplinary device is less likely to work. Institutional gridlock deprives party leaders of 
their capacity to exercise their power to control the legislative agenda, which serves the 
critical role in maintaining party unity. Also, as it becomes more difficult for parties to 
achieve outcomes as close as possible to their ideal points, legislators have fewer incentives 
to cooperate for partisan goals. Facing this situation, the centralized candidate selection 
process can backfire – party members may voice their dissent or even choose to exit over 
loyalty. But this possibility remains statistically insignificant.  
Regarding the interaction between institutional constraints and candidate selection, 
Figure 4.2 shows how marginal impact of POLCON varies across the range of candidate 
selection methods. As expected, the institutional constraints on policy change have a  
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Figure 4.2 
 
 
 
greater negative effect as party leaders exercise a more centralized influence in selecting 
candidates. One unexpected finding is that the institutional effect becomes positive when 
the candidate selection process is decentralized to a larger extent. I also provide a frequency 
distribution for the variable Candidate Selection plotted on the horizontal axis to access the 
relative density of observations across its range. Of the sample observations, about 10%, 
including the United States (-3.34) and Iceland (-3.03), lie in this range. While they are not 
a trivial set of outlier observations, such observations are only 5% and 0.8% respectively 
when electoral systems and regime types are controlled for, and when additionally 
characteristics of party systems are controlled for; and such observations do not exist in the 
dynamic model where the Party Unity index in the previous year is included as an 
additional regressor (see Table 4.6). 
 
122 
 
 
Table 4.4 Estimates for Voting Unity 
 
  Voting Unity 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient   Standard Error Coefficient   
Standard 
Error 
POLCON -0.308 * 0.164 -0.306 * 0.163
Candidate Selection 0.473 *** 0.100 0.446 *** 0.096
POLCON*Candidate 
Selection -0.391 ** 0.166 -0.377 ** 0.167
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 * 0.000
Democracy -0.003 0.004 -0.003  0.004
Party Age 0.002 0.008 0.004  0.003
Ethnic Fractionalization    -0.506 * 0.281
       
 Year FE Year FE   
 Country FE Country RE   
       
           
Countries 129     129     
Years (Max) 21  21   
Obs 1860  1860   
R2 (within) 0.249     0.247     
       
Outcome: legislative voting unity. Unit of analysis: country-year. FE: fixed effects. RE: random effects.  
Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), standard errors clustered by country.  
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10.      
 
 
To further check the robustness of the findings, I evaluate how sensitive the estimates are 
with respect to alternative model specifications. I first reanalyze the data by disaggregating 
the Party Unity index into the two individual components: voting unity and party switching. 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show the additional analysis results that are largely consistent with 
the previous findings.  
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Table 4.5 Estimates for Party Switching 
 
  Party Switching 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coefficient   Standard Error Coefficient   
Standard 
Error 
POLCON 0.484 ** 0.216 0.467 ** 0.213 
Candidate Selection -0.342 *** 0.103 -0.318 *** 0.097 
POLCON*Candidate 
Selection 0.593 ** 0.211 0.208 ** 0.208 
GDP per capita 0.000  0.000 0.000 ** 0.000 
Democracy 0.008  0.006 0.006  0.006 
Party Age -0.022 ** 0.010 -0.016 *** 0.003 
Ethnic Fractionalization    0.637  0.447 
       
 Year FE   Year FE   
 Country FE   Country RE   
       
        
Countries 129     129     
Years (Max) 21   21   
Obs 1860   1860   
R2 (within) 0.193     0.191     
Outcome: party switching. Unit of analysis: country-year. FE: fixed effects. RE: random effects.  
Estimator: OLS (ordinary least squares), standard errors clustered by country.  
*** p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10.      
 
 
Figure 4.3a and 4.3b first show that centralized candidate selection largely 
encourages party members to vote with other members of their parties, and discourages 
members’ party switching. Such effect decreases as institutional arrangements make 
significant policy change less likely. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 4.3c, the 
marginal effect of POLCON on Voting Unity is negative and significant to the extent that 
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Figure 4.3 Marginal Effects of Candidate Selection and POLCON 
 
 
the candidate selection is centralized, but it does not reach a statistical significance when 
candidate selection is largely decentralized. Party switching shows similar patterns as a 
mirror image, as shown in Figure 4.3d.47   
                                                            
47 Additionally, Figure 4.3b suggests that inconsistent finding of party unity previously discussed 
is largely driven by the negative institutional effect under the decentralized candidate selection 
estimated in Table 3.5. But again, this inconsistency disappears when I control for other key control 
variables including electoral systems, regime types, and party system characteristics.  
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Table 4.6 Estimates for Party Unity 
 
   Party Unity          
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   Coef     SE  Coef     SE  Coef     SE 
POLCON  ‐0.435  **  0.189  ‐0.369  ***  0.153  ‐0.151  *  0.090 
Candidate 
Selection  0.364 
**
*  0.106  0.322 
**
*  0.077  0.140 
*
*  0.055 
POLCON*Candidat
e Selection  ‐0.543  **  0.213  ‐0.451 
**
*  0.161  ‐0.237 
*
*  0.112 
GDP per capita  0.000    0.000  0.000  **  0.000  0.000    0.000 
Democracy  ‐0.004  *  0.002  ‐0.004    0.003  0.000    0.002 
Party Age  0.010    0.010  0.006 
**
*  0.003  0.001    0.003 
Closed‐List PR  ‐0.681 
**
*  0.217  ‐0.829 
**
*  0.285  ‐0.334 
*
*  0.103 
Parliamentary  0.008    0.038  0.030    0.031  0.047  *  0.028 
Party Linkages      ‐0.193 
**
*  0.062  ‐0.110 
*
*  0.040 
Party Organizations      0.251    0.171  0.110  *  0.064 
Party Branches      0.065    0.143  0.040    0.069 
           
 Year FE    Year FE    Year FE   
 Country FE    Country FE    Country FE   
       
Dynamic 
Model   
                   
Countries  82        82        82       
Years (Max)  21     21     21     
Obs  1102     1102     1102     
R2 (within)  0.349        0.400        0.73       
 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows a series of different models that extend the basic models with additional 
variables that could possibly affect the original estimates. The additional control variables 
include the closed-list proportional electoral system (dummy variable), regime types 
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(dummy variable), and several important characteristics of the party systems, including 
party linkages (continuous, from “clientelistic” to “policy/programmatic”), party 
organizations (continuous, from “no parties with permanent organizations” to “more than 
half of the parties with permanent organizations”), and party branches (continuous, from 
“no parties with permanent local branches” to “more than half of the parties with permanent 
local branches”). All variables are defined in Appendix 4A. In Model 1, the results show 
that my findings hold even after controlling for existing explanations that emphasize the 
role of closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems (Hix 2004) or parliamentary 
systems (Carey 2007; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006; Samuels and Shugart 2010). Indeed, 
the results do not support the existing claims, in terms of the direction of the association 
and their statistical significance. In particular, parliamentary systems have relatively higher 
party unity than other types, including presidential systems and semi-presidential systems, 
but their substantive effect is minimal and statistically insignificant.48  The closed-list PR 
systems and policy-oriented party linkages do not  make parties more united, and the 
direction of association was opposite to the common claims.49 In Model 3, I estimate a 
dynamic model by include Yi,t−1, Party Unity Index in the previous year. My main findings 
still hold despite the different model specifications (also refer to Figure 4.4). 
 
 
                                                            
48 In fact, there are several quantitative studies that also do not find the significant impact of the 
regime type (e.g., Hix 2004; Coman 2015). 
49 According to additional analysis, policy-oriented party linkages discourage voting unity while 
they encourages party switching. The closed lists are likely to encourage party switching. On the 
other hand, its impact on voting unity is positive but it is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.4 Marginal Effects of POLCON 
 
(a) Model 1 
 
(b) Model 2 
 
 
(c) Model 3 
 
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This article examined how institutional setting for policy making shape party unity. First, 
it explains party unity as the result of legislators’ actions and response to incentives and 
constraints determined by their institutional surroundings. Second, I view party unity as a 
broad concept that encompasses party members’ decisions to vote together and their 
decisions to belong together. Connecting the literature on political parties to the analytical 
framework of comparative political institutions, I demonstrate how institutional conditions 
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for policy making affect political parties’ abilities and incentives to foster unity. In 
particular, I argue that the institutional arrangements allowing for a greater extent of policy 
change should increase party unity and magnify the impact of candidate selection – one of 
party leaders’ key disciplinary tools – on party unity.  
Using the largest time-series cross-section dataset on party unity to date, I confirm 
my hypotheses. I utilize new measures of party unity that can complement the previous 
measure based on roll-call data, and I incorporate two separate lines of research within a 
consistent framework. I find that institutional constraints on policy change are a significant 
and substantively important factor to account for legislators’ partisan behavior. As 
institutional arrangements do not allow significant policy changes, party members are more 
likely to voice their dissent and exit as well. Also, I find that the positive impact of 
centralized candidate selection on party unity is conditioned by the institutional 
arrangements that structure policy making. This resolves some of the conflicting claims 
regarding the determinants of party unity. On one hand, my findings confirm previous 
arguments that emphasize the way policy making is organized by institutional context. 
Nevertheless, those claims have either been derived theoretically or advanced on the basis 
of evidence from a small number of cases (Cox 1987; Cheibub 2007; 2009; Figueiredo and 
Lomongi 2000), but they have rarely been tested with large-scale quantitative data. The 
new dataset affords a greater leverage in estimating and disentangling the effects of 
different institutional factors, and my analysis accounts for country heterogeneity using 
fixed effects, ruling out the possibility that time-invariant unobserved characteristics drive 
the effects. The results are robust across different model specifications.   
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Several caveats to my study should be noted for future research. First, the key 
dependent variables including voting unity and party switching are measured at the 
aggregate level.  However, we can easily imagine that different characteristics of parties, 
or legislators, could play a significant role in shaping their actions in response to the given 
institutional context. To scrutinize the micro-foundations of the institutional effect, further 
investigations of multilevel data would be necessary. Second, in this article, I propose 
several potential mechanisms that underlie the relationship between institutional 
constraints on policy change and party unity. While the focus of this study is not on the 
identification of the central process that drives the institutional effect, future research 
should explore the specific mechanisms. Finally, this study is aligned with the established 
notion that party unity encompasses a variety of party members’ actions and responses as 
an organizational characteristic. In this light, both voicing dissent and exiting are 
understood as behavioral attributes that constitute party disunity. Future work could 
explore the conditions under which legislators choose voice instead of exit, or vice versa.   
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Appendix 4A.1 Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Voting Unity: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of 
their party on important bills? Responses: (0) Not really. Many members are elected as 
independents and party discipline is very weak. (1) More often than not. Members are more 
likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common. (2) Mostly. 
Members vote with their parties most of the time. (3) Yes, absolutely. Members vote with 
their parties almost all the time. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). 
 
Party Switching: Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature 
changes or abandons their party in between elections? Does not include official party splits 
(when one party divides into two or more parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally 
dissolves). Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). 
 
POLCON (Political Constraints Index) III: This index measures the feasibility of policy 
change, i.e. the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one political actor may 
lead to a change in government policy. The index is constructed from 1) the number of 
independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, 2) the extent of 
party alignment across branches of government, and 3) the extent of preference 
heterogeneity within each legislative branch. Source: Henisz (2000). 
 
Candidate Selection - National/Local: How centralized is legislative candidate selection 
within the parties? The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often 
divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and 
national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes 
candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party 
organization. Responses: (0) National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by 
national party leaders. (1) National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national 
party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations. (2) 
National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of 
party organization. (3) National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level 
organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency 
groups. (4) National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal 
level actors. (5) National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct 
primaries. Scale reversed. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). 
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Democracy index (Vanhanen): Derived by multiplying Vanhanen’s Competition Index 
(100 - votes won by the largest party in presidential or parliamentary elections (or both, 
averaged) as % of total votes cast) and Participation Index, an aggregate measure of the 
turnout in elections (percentage of the total population who voted in the same election) and 
the number of referendums, and then dividing this product by 100. Sources: Vanhanen 
(2000). 
 
Party Age: Average age of three largest parties in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of 
the national legislature. Source: Database of Political Institutions 2012 (updated Jan. 2013) 
(Beck et al. 2001) 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization: The probability that two randomly chosen individuals within a 
society are members of different ethnic groups, calculated with the Herfindahl index. 
Source: Alesina et al (2003) 
 
GDP Per Capita: Gross domestic product per capita. Source: Maddison Project (Bolt & 
van Zanden 2014) 
 
Closed List: A dummy variable of whether closed lists are used. When PR is “1”, closed 
list gets a “1” if voters cannot express preferences for candidates within a party list, 0 if 
voters can. If PR is “NA” or 0, and Mean District Magnitude =1, Closed list is NA. If PR 
is “NA” or 0 and Mean District Magnitude is greater than one, the following rules apply: 
1) If only one party takes seats, closed list is: “0” (open list), if the number of candidates 
is greater than the number of seats in an 
electoral district in a one-party state where other parties may or may not be illegal (LIEC 
is 4 or 5), “1” (closed list), if the number of candidates equals the number of seats in an 
electoral district in a one party state where other parties are illegal (LIEC is 3), blank, if it 
is unclear whether there is more than one candidate for every seat in an electoral district in 
a one-party state where other parties are illegal (LIEC is 3.5). 2) If there are multiple parties 
taking seats, closed list is blank unless the system is explicitly stated as open or closed. 
Source: Database of Political Institutions 2012 (updated Jan. 2013) (Beck et al. 2001) 
 
Parliamentary: A dummy variable of parliamentary system or not. Reconstructed from 
Database of Political Institutions 2012 (updated Jan. 2013) (Beck et al. 2001). If 
parliamentary system, 1 and otherwise (including both presidential system, and semi-
presidential system), 0. Source: Database of Political Institutions 2012 (updated Jan. 2013) 
(Beck et al. 2001) 
 
Party Linkages: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of 
linkage to their constituents? A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that 
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the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities. 
Responses: (0) Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs. (1) 
Mixed clientelistic and local collective. (2) Local collective. Constituents are rewarded 
with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local 
development. (3) Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic. (4) 
Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, 
general party programs, and visions for society. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015). 
 
Party Organizations: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent 
organizations? A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who 
are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season. Responses: 
(0) No parties. (1) Fewer than half of the parties. (2) About half of the parties. (3) More 
than half of the parties. (4) All parties. Source: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2015).  
 
Party Branches: How many parties have permanent local party branches? Responses: (0) 
None. (1) Fewer than half. (2) About half. (3) More than half. (4) All. Source: V-Dem 
(Coppedge et al. 2015). 
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